

Family history and attitudes toward outgroups: Evidence from the Syrian refugee crisis*

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January 2018

Abstract

We examine how analogous thinking about family history affects outgroup bias. We provide evidence from Greece, a country that serves as an entry port to Europe for a large number of refugees, and whose native population partly consists of descendants of ethnic Greeks that were forcibly relocated from Turkey in the early 20th century. Combining historical and survey data with an experimental manipulation, we show that mentioning the parallels between past and present forced displacement leads to substantial increases in monetary donations and attitudinal measures of sympathy for refugees among respondents with forcibly displaced ancestors. This effect is also found among Greeks without a family history of forced migration, but only in places with a large historical concentration of Greek refugees from Turkey, where this historical experience is salient. Overall, our findings suggest that harnessing past experience can be an effective way of increasing empathy and reducing outgroup discrimination.

*We thank David Laitin, Thomas Leeper, Sergi Pardos-Prado, Hans-Joachim Voth, members of the Immigration Policy Lab at Stanford University, and participants at the Politics Research Colloquium at Oxford, the 2017 NICEP Conference, the 2017 APSA Annual Conference, the Historical Political Economy and Gender Politics workshop organized by the IPErG in 2017, the 2017 UC Berkeley International Migration and Refugee Law Workshop, the 2017 London School of Economics and Political Science workshop on The Changing Landscape of Political Choice in Europe, and the University of Michigan workshop on Historical Legacies and Memory for their helpful comments and suggestions. This research was supported by a seed grant of the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at Stanford University.

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Since 2015, more than 1.5 million refugees have fled to Europe from war-torn countries in the Middle East and Africa. The migrant crisis has created social and political turmoil, increasing pressures in receiving countries to integrate the surging number of asylum-seekers. This proves to be a challenging task, however, as recent research shows that native populations exhibit exclusionary attitudes and are unwilling to accommodate most refugees (Bansak et al., 2016). These findings echo those of a large literature on attitudes toward immigrants, that finds xenophobia, particularly toward religiously and culturally distant groups, to be the modal answer of natives to immigrant inflows (Sniderman et al., 2004; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

And yet, many people in receiving countries are descendants of migrants—both immigration and forced population movements were common in the last 200 years. Can this simple fact be leveraged to reduce prejudice and increase empathy toward modern-day forced migrants? While research in social psychology and political science demonstrates the difficulty of reducing outgroup bias (Paluck, 2009; Paluck and Green, 2009), those interventions that succeed in fostering sympathy often rely on active perspective-taking (Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio et al., 2003; Broockman and Kalla, 2016). Harnessing personal experiences, both of oneself and one’s family, and their similarity to those of the outgroup, can be an effective and underappreciated way to enhance the capacity for perspective-taking. Here, we demonstrate the potential of this approach to foster sympathy toward refugees by exploiting the parallels between the current migrant crisis and one of the most prominent cases of forced displacement in the 20th century.

Our study is conducted in Greece, a country that serves as an entry port to Europe for a large number of refugees today and whose present-day population composition was also significantly determined by a population exchange in the early 20th century. After the defeat of the Greek army in the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–1922, Greece and the newly formed Republic of Turkey signed an international treaty agreeing to a compulsory exchange of populations. The exchange was carried out on the basis of religion, with approximately 1.2–1.4 million Orthodox Christians expelled from the regions of Asia Minor and Pontus in Turkey and 350,000 Muslims expelled from Northern Greece. The inflow of refugees from Turkey amounted to almost 25% of Greece’s then population of 5 millions. Newly settled refugees faced adverse economic and social conditions in the first years of their settlement in Greece, and were often treated with mistrust and outright discrimination by the natives. Today, 80 years later, and after a successful settlement effort undertaken by the Greek government with international assistance, both the second and the third generations of refugees from Turkey are fully integrated and indistinguishable from native Greeks, both in terms of observable characteristics and of the way they are perceived by the larger population.

We conduct a survey in Macedonia, the part of Northern Greece that received the largest inflows of Greek Orthodox forced migrants (henceforth Asia Minor refugees) from Turkey during the 1920s. We collect a number of behavioral and attitudinal measures of sympathy for current refugees, together with detailed demographics that allow us to identify descendants of Asia Minor refugees, up to the generation of the grandparents. To causally assess the effect

of family experience on attitudes, we randomly expose part of the (full) sample of respondents to a salience treatment, that makes explicit the similarity between past and present forced relocation. We compare the effect of the treatment between Asia Minor descendants and other respondents and find a positive effect on attitudes and behavior toward Syrian refugees, but only for the former group of survey participants. The estimated effect is large. Among Asia Minor descendants, the treatment “persuades” (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007) 15.9% of respondents to donate money to UNHCR and increases their contribution by up to 18%. It also substantially transforms attitudes towards refugees, and in particular the perception of their motivations for leaving their home country. In response to the treatment, descendants of Greek refugees are almost a quarter of a standard deviation more likely than other Greeks to view Syrians as asylum seekers fleeing war, rather than as economic migrants.

Our findings highlight the potential that salience interventions have for tangibly affecting behavior toward outgroups. The effect of the treatment is particularly pronounced for outcomes that previously did not significantly differ from those of other Greeks, but is smaller for domains in which Asia Minor refugees were already positively predisposed toward Syrians. In particular, the salience of the connection between historical and current forced migration has a large effect on behavioral measures, such as contacting politicians or donating resources to refugees, which, unlike attitudes, were not higher for Asia Minor refugees in the baseline. Importantly, in municipalities with a higher historical share of refugees, the salience treatment also has a positive effect on the behavior and attitudes of Greeks without a family past of forced migration. This indicates that the impact of such interventions can have positive spillovers outside the directly relevant ingroup.

Our results bridge three previously unconnected strands of literature in the social sciences. Studies in economics and political science provide evidence for the importance of family as a mechanism for political socialization, and for the intergenerational transmission of preferences, historical memory and attitudes toward outgroups (Jennings et al., 2009; Balcells, 2012). Another strand of literature in social psychology and economics finds that priming naturally occurring social identities can affect preferences and behaviors (Benjamin et al., 2010; Cohn et al., 2014). We show that insights from these two lines of research can be used to inform research on prejudice reduction. Priming identities transmitted through the family can facilitate empathy and increase the capacity for perspective-taking. Prompting people to reflect on another’s condition using not only one’s own past but also that of one’s relatives as a frame of reference increases the range of experiences that individuals can relate to and thus the potential for empathy.

Finally, our study relates to a large literature on attitudes toward immigration and immigrants (Hainmueller et al., 2015; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Much of this literature examines the role of economic competition on xenophobia (Malhotra et al., 2013), but several studies have explicitly investigated what works for reducing hostility, highlighting factors like information provision and perspective taking (Grigorieff et al., 2016; Facchini et al., 2016; Adida et al., 2017). We highlight a new and complementary mechanism in reducing xenophobia that is applicable to many countries with a significant past of immigration or forced

relocation that are receiving new and large migrant flows today.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We start by discussing how family experience can moderate attitudes toward outgroups. We then explain the context of our empirical study. We describe the migrant crisis and its impact on Greece from 2015 onwards, and offer an account of the 1920s population exchange that shaped Greece’s modern history and demography. We proceed to outline our research design, describe our survey and data and present the results. Finally, we offer our interpretation of the findings and discuss the role of explicit salience interventions in reducing prejudice.

Family experience and attitudes toward outgroups

Historical memory transmitted within the family or local environment has been shown to shape preferences and beliefs in a number of domains. Much of this literature has focused on demonstrating the long-run persistence of attitudes toward outgroups. [Voigtländer and Voth \(2012\)](#) find that local level differences in anti-Semitism in Germany trace their origins back to Jewish Pogroms during the time of the Black Plague. [Nunn and Wantchekon \(2011\)](#) demonstrate the negative effect of the slave trade on the low levels of both interpersonal and generalized trust in Africa today. Most of these studies allude to the role of the family and local community as carrier of collective memories, beliefs and norms from one generation to the next, but do not test this role explicitly. More specific focus is placed on the family in studies examining the long-run impact of victimization experiences. [Balcells \(2012\)](#) shows that victimization in the Spanish civil war leaves a long-term trauma that turns family members of both current and posterior generations against the political representatives of the side of the perpetrator, whereas [Aguilar et al. \(2011\)](#) suggest that it also colors people’s views about transitional justice. Similarly, [Rozenas et al. \(2017\)](#) find that communities in Western Ukraine that experienced indiscriminate violence during the Stalin era are today less likely to support “pro-Russian” parties. [Lupu and Peisakhin \(2015\)](#) extend this evidence, using a unique intergenerational survey of Crimean Tatars, showing that the intensity of Stalinist violence incurred within the family predicts higher levels of ingroup attachment and anti-Russian hostility even two generations later.

Can family history, through its analogy with current events, affect people’s attitudes toward new outgroups? The present study contributes to the broad literature referenced above by answering this question in the context of the current migrant crisis. Drawing on a large number of studies in social psychology and cultural sociology, we hypothesize that sharing the similarity of past traumatic experiences and outgroup membership increases empathy and the capacity for perspective-taking. Previous studies have highlighted the role of perspective taking in ameliorating outgroup prejudice ([Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000](#); [Bilewicz, 2009](#)), ingroup favoritism ([Lamm et al., 2007](#)) and subtle racial biases ([Todd et al., 2011](#)). When encouraged to visualize themselves in the conditions experienced by an outgroup, individuals report higher empathy with the outgroup. Both lab and field experiments suggest that perspective taking can be more effective in reducing stereotypic biases than other strategies,

such as stereotype suppression (Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000), and that it works equally well irrespective of whether individuals are confronted with stereotype confirming or disconfirming information (Vescio et al., 2003).

Here, we study the role of shared past experience as a mediator of these processes and hypothesize that the similarity of experience facilitates perspective taking and can additionally act as a means of group recategorization. As indicated by research in social psychology, the salience of a superordinate group identity – in this case that of “refugee” – can reduce intergroup bias (Gaertner et al., 1993). Based on such reasoning, we expect that highlighting similarities in past experiences between refugees and the native population in receiving countries can decrease bias and foster sympathy toward today’s asylum seekers.¹

We test this hypothesis in Greece, the first European country to experience the massive refugee arrivals of 2015. The next section provides more information on this refugee wave and Greece’s history of forced migration.

Present and past refugee waves in Greece

The 2015 migrant crisis

The escalation of the Syrian civil war gave rise to one of the most severe refugee crises the world has witnessed since the aftermath of WWII. Between 2015 and 2017, more than 14 million refugees have been under UNHCR mandate and more than 2 million new asylum claims have been submitted in Europe alone (UNHCR, 2017). Serving as the entry point to the European Union from the Middle East, Greece has felt vividly the refugee inflows, receiving more than 50% of all refugees crossing into Europe (UNHCR, 2015). Although the vast majority of these arrivals were temporary and most refugees continued their journey into Central and Western Europe, the closure of the Macedonian borders in the spring of 2016 transformed Greece from a transit destination into a host country, accommodating approximately 50,000 refugees. The management of both the transient yet massive and continuous early arrivals and the long-term needs of the remaining population required a series of in-the-field interventions. The successful implementation of these policies is partly contingent upon the degree of support within the local population. Whereas solidarity to the displaced can complement welfare provision by the state, anti-refugee sentiment might hinder the effective implementation of integration policy initiatives. The incorporation of refugee children into Greek schools represents one such example of a policy the success of which has varied, depending on natives’ predispositions

¹By exploiting variation in the salience of family experience, our study also relates to a strand of research that examines how the salience of history affects behavior and attitudes. Fouka and Voth (2016) show that past grievances may remain latent for long periods of time but can be re-activated by political events and affect important behavioral outcomes such as consumption patterns. Chen et al. (2016) conduct a survey experiment in China among individuals whose ancestors had either benefitted or lost by wealth redistribution during the Communist Revolution. They show that the nature of ancestors’ experiences determines one’s present-day views on redistribution.

toward refugees.²

Natives' attitudes toward refugees emerge, therefore, as an important factor moderating the degree of refugee integration into the host countries. The problem, however, is that public opinion in Europe seems reluctant to accommodate refugee arrivals. Looking at representative surveys obtained in 2015 from fifteen countries, [Bansak et al. \(2016\)](#) show that the median voter in all of them is opposed to receiving more asylum seekers. Greece appears to be no exception to this pattern, with less than 25% of respondents being supportive of increasing the number of asylum seekers. Exposure to refugees seems to exacerbate these negative orientations, increasing the vote for the radical right ([Dinas et al., 2017](#)) and inducing more hostile sentiments toward refugees, immigrants and Muslims ([Hangartner et al., 2017](#)).

These findings pose an intriguing paradox. This stems from the fact that Greece's native population consists in large part of refugees, orthodox populations scattered around the Ottoman empire and forcibly displaced after the defeat of the Greek army in the summer of 1922. In what follows we provide a brief chronicle of the arrival and eventual settlement of these populations in Greece.

The 1923 exchange of populations

Greece entered WWI in 1917 on the side of the Entente, after having been promised territorial access in Anatolia. In 1919 the Greek forces landed in Izmir, initiating a military campaign into the interior of a fading Ottoman empire. The campaign was halted in the beginning of 1922, by the successful counter-attack of the newly-formed Turkish army. While putting an end to Greece's irredentist expansion, the Turkish military victory was accompanied by extensive retaliation and reprisals against the Christian populations. Atrocities spiraled, leaving no choice to the targeted populace but to try to escape, typically to Greece through the Aegean sea. As [Hirschon \(2003\)](#) puts it, "[t]hroughout the region, from villages and towns, the population fled with little more than their lives." In effect, this exodus marks the first, chaotic and massive, of the two waves of refugee arrivals, counting approximately one million destitute people – mainly children and women, as men between 15 and 45 were retained in labor camps ([League of Nations, 1926](#)).

International voluntary relief organizations, such as the Red Cross and the Save the Children Fund undertook the task of providing minimal shelter, food and some medical care to those arriving in masses from the Asia Minor coast. Trying to prevent a seemingly unavoidable humanitarian crisis, the League of Nations initiated peace negotiations, which resulted in the Convention on the Exchange of Populations, signed in January 1923. The Convention put forward an ambitious plan of population exchange in an attempt to minimize the presence

²Both media coverage and the Asylum Information Database (AIDA) report on access to education point to the key role of local natives. See [The New Arab](#), "Refugee children marginalised in Greek schools as afternoon programme fails", 30 June, 2017, BBC, "Greece's refugee children learn the hard way", 19 April 2017 and the [AIDA summary](#).

of potentially disruptive minorities in the two countries. The criterion for this compulsory exchange was religion, with the target groups being “Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion” and “Greek nationals of the Moslem religion.” In practice, many of these orthodox populations were not Greek-, but either Turkish-speaking or Pontic Greek speakers (Veremis, 2003). The second and more organized wave of expulsion started thus in 1923 and resulted in the arrival of somewhat fewer than 200,000 people. More importantly, the Convention ensured that those who had already arrived would be denied return to their homeland and would be given automatically Greek citizenship rights. Combined, the two waves summed up to more than 1.2 million destitute refugees arriving in Greece between 1922 and 1923. To achieve the settlement and integration of refugees into the Greek territory, the League of Nations and the Greek government set up the Refugee Settlement Commission (RSC), an international body “charged with the settlement of the refugees in Greece upon lands assigned to it, or otherwise in productive work” (American Friends of Greece, 1924). As is shown in Figure 1 most refugees were settled in the region of Macedonia, chosen due to the vast areas of uncultivated but cultivable land and the fertile estates left vacant after the departure of the Muslim population. Up until 1929 over half a million people were settled in this region.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Refugees underwent a profoundly traumatic experience. Dispossessed of their property, they experienced severe physical hardship, economic and status deprivation, downward social mobility, segregation and outright discrimination (Mavrogordatos, 1983). More often than not, interactions with locals were marked by hostility and prejudice. Indicative in this respect is the almost complete absence of marriages between refugees and locals during the first decade of the colonization process. In some villages locals avoided any type of contact with refugees, who were more prone to illness due to the ordeals they had suffered as well as due to their vulnerability to the local scourge and to tuberculosis (Kontogiorgi, 2006). Even by 1933 some newspapers would propose that refugees be required to wear yellow armbands so as to be identifiable and avoided by locals (Mavrogordatos, 1983, 195). Competition over scarce resources added to the strife and increased the degree of anti-refugee sentiment among the locals. Despite provisions by the Greek government and the RSC, locals often organized to prevent refugees from settling in on the land vacated by the Muslim population. Frictions between the two sides were very frequent and disputes often led to violence.

Initial difficulties notwithstanding, the settlement and integration of refugees into Greek society has been characterized as the greatest peaceful achievement of the modern Greek state and nation (Mavrogordatos, 1983). The story of Asia Minor refugees has been described as an exemplary case of integration, with the second generation, after the end of WWII, already fully assimilated within the Greek society (Kontogiorgi, 2006; Hirschon, 1998). Despite this, the Asia Minor identity remained vivid, both as passport to rights for benefits and, less instrumentally but more crucially, as the product of socialization into the collective memory (Eyerman, 2001). The settlers appropriated the term “refugees” (prosfyghes), which together with the term “Asia Minor people” (Mikrasiates) would denote first a common bond based

on the shared experience of forced relocation and second an overarching cultural dichotomy between themselves, the newcomers, and the locals (Hirschon, 1998, 30-31). This collective identity was almost immediately institutionalized in the form of local refugee associations and unions, which spread around the country soon after the refugee arrivals and remained active ever since.

In what follows, we examine descendants of this group of refugees and how family experience impacts their attitudes toward today’s refugees. To the extent that refugee identity can be effectively transmitted from the previous generation to the next, how effective is it in coloring people’s attitudes toward contemporaneous groups of similar attributes? In the next section we present our research design in order to answer this question empirically.

Research design

We conduct a survey using Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) in the region of Macedonia, in the north of Greece, and the island of Lesbos, which collectively received more than 55% of the total inflow of refugees from Asia Minor in the early 20th century. Today, both Macedonia and Lesbos host several accommodation facilities that have received a high per capita number of Syrian refugees since the start of the 2015 migrant crisis. To maximize the likelihood of finding second and third-generation descendants of Asia Minor refugees we only interview people aged 30 or older and sample from each prefecture proportionally to their recorded shares of refugees in the 1928 census. We exclude prefecture capitals, which are larger and have higher mobility rates and thus make it more likely that interviewed individuals come from different parts of Greece and have no Asia Minor background.³ We end up with a sample of 1,928 respondents, out of whom 927 have a forced relocation background, distributed across municipalities as shown in Figure 2. The first column of Table 1 presents summary statistics. While the nature of our survey methodology and our geographic and demographic focus prevents us from having a representative sample, we do end up with wide coverage of occupational and educational groups.⁴ In any case, the internal validity of our design relies on

³Figure B.1 in the appendix shows that there is indeed a strong positive relationship between the proportion of refugee descendants in our end sample and the share of refugees in a prefecture in 1928.

⁴23.4% of our sample has a university degree, compared to 12.2% of the Greek population over 30, according to the 2011 Greek census. This education gap between sample and population is a common pattern in CATI surveys. In a 2016 national survey conducted by the same polling company (Antoniou et al., 2017), the share of respondents with university degrees was 32.93%, indicating that our sample is, if anything, closer to the population target than the typical nationwide CATI survey. One concern with restricting the sample geographically could be that the historical presence of Muslims in the region has created a long-standing bias against this group, which may have been transmitted to later generations. This would imply that refugee descendants are compared against a group with unrepresentatively low levels of empathy for today’s asylum seekers. To see whether this is the case, we compare the attitudes of non-refugee descendants in the control group with attitudes reported in a nationally representative survey, publicly available online (Dianeosis, 2016). In both surveys respondents are asked whether refugees a) should be granted resident rights; b) are likely to increase crime; and c) increase the probability of a terror attack. Among respondents without a refugee background ($n \approx 500$), 41.6%, 32% and 46% agree with each of these statements respectively. The equivalent

within-sample randomization and is not compromised by the lack of representativeness.⁵ Our sampling strategy, as well as all the details of our research design were specified in advance in a pre-analysis plan available at <http://egap.org/registration/2561>.

[Figure 2 about here.]

The survey was framed as a generic interview on the political behavior of Greeks and, among other questions, it also included views toward asylum-seekers. For a randomly selected half of the respondents, the introduction to this set of questions contained a phrase intended to highlight the similarity between past forced relocation and present migrant crisis. Respondents were told the following (emphasis indicates treatment condition):

Greece has received recently a large wave of refugees from Syria and other Asian countries. *Today's refugee crisis is reminiscent of the story of the Asia Minor refugees after the Asia Minor catastrophe.* I would now like to read to you some opinions that have been expressed by some people about refugees. For each one of these sentences I would like you to tell me if you strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree or strongly disagree.

Asia Minor catastrophe is the standard way in which the historical episode of population exchange is referred to in Greek history textbooks (Yildirim, 2006). It is not uncommon for Greek media, or for groups aiming at raising awareness and collecting help for refugees to compare the experience of Asian refugees today to the historical experience of Greek Orthodox refugees from Turkey.⁶ As such, it should not be a surprising parallelism for respondents.

Following this manipulation, we collected a series of attitudinal and quasi-behavioral measures of support for refugees, other outgroups, as well as other measures of identity and memory. The demographic questions that allowed us to identify refugee descendants were asked only at the end of the survey and were open-ended (i.e. we did not ask respondents to choose a birthplace from a list). This sequencing of questions is important for our design, because it mitigates concerns related to the presence of demand effects. Interviewers do not know (and respondents are aware that they do not know) who is from a family that originates from Turkey, and are thus unlikely to provide responses favorable to refugees out of social desirability motivations. We define as descendants of Asia Minor refugees those individuals with at

figures from the nation-wide survey are 32% for the first item and 45% for the next two. This indicates that our comparison group is broadly comparable with the national average and, if anything, more positive toward refugees, thus making the region of Macedonia a harder test of our hypothesis.

⁵Importantly, there is no correlation between response rate and 1928 refugee share per prefecture (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.0006, p-value>0.9).

⁶For example, the 2016 Thessaloniki Annual Bookfair involved a thematic tribute titled “Refugees then and now,” which juxtaposed the experience of past and present refugees in Greece through photographic exhibitions, documentaries and roundtable discussions. The municipal art gallery of Piraeus, another area of Greece that received large inflows of refugees in the early 1920s, launched a double exhibition in January 2017, with photographic material from the population exchange of 1923 and the contemporary migrant camps on Greek islands.

least one parent or grandparent born in Asia Minor, Pontus or Istanbul. Table 1 shows that treatment randomization was successful and the sample is balanced in terms of observables. Importantly, the share of respondents who report an Asia Minor background does not differ between treatment and control group. This helps alleviate concerns of a potential source of bias, namely that Asia Minor descendants in the treatment group who express negative views toward refugees are more likely to falsely report that they have no refugee background. If this were the case, we would observe a higher share of descendants in the control group.⁷

[Table 1 about here.]

A reference to Asia Minor is likely to affect not just the direct descendants of Asia Minor refugees. The Asia Minor catastrophe is an important event in the modern history of Greece, and its salience could be priming perspective taking or national identity for Greeks more broadly. To isolate the effect of family experience we treat Greeks without a refugee ancestor as a second control group and compare the effect of the salience treatment between Asia Minor refugee descendants and other respondents in a specification of the form:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 T_i \times D_i + \gamma X_i + v_i \quad (1)$$

where T_i and D_i are indicators for the Asia Minor salience treatment and refugee descendants, respectively, and X_i is a vector of individual controls.

We collect three quasi-behavioral measures of support for refugees. The first one is a donation to the UNHCR, decided as a fraction of a 100-euro voucher to be raffled among participants at the end of the survey. We record both whether respondents are willing to donate any positive amount and the actual amount they decide to contribute. The second one is the option to inform the members of the Greek Parliament that the respondent wishes to increase or decrease (4-point Likert scale) the number of approved asylum applications. Respondents would have to agree to this eponymously, by providing their name and location. The last one is signing a petition to push the government to provide housing for asylum-seekers in hostels and hospitality centers instead of open-air asylum camps. We additionally collect two sets of attitudinal measures. The first set elicits respondents' agreement with the following statements in a 5-point Likert scale:

1. Children of asylum seekers in Greece should be allowed to study in Greek schools.
2. Refugees who live in our country should be granted asylum and residence rights.

⁷We also tested whether the treatment yielded differential levels of item-non-response in the questions that followed afterwards. A difference in means test between treatment and control group in the count of not answered post-treatment questions yields a p-value of 0.82. The same test between refugee descendants and the rest of the sample yielded a p-value of 0.37. Finally, when regressing item missingness on each of the two binary indicators and their interaction, none of the terms is statistically different from zero with the p-value corresponding to the interaction term being 0.701.

3. The money spent to fund the on-going presence of refugees in Greece could be better spent on the needs of Greeks.
4. Refugees will increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack in our country.
5. Refugees in our country are more to blame for crime than other groups.

The order of the statements is randomized and they are presented in way such that the highest level of agreement with a statement does not always indicate maximum sympathy for refugees. This reduces the likelihood that any responses are driven by interviewer demand effects, since it makes it harder for respondents to guess for which statement and in which direction the interviewer would like their responses to be affected by the mention to the Asia Minor catastrophe. We create binary indicators out of these responses, by assigning the value one to individuals who agree or strongly agree with statements 1 and 2 and who disagree or strongly disagree with statements 3, 4, and 5. The second set of outcomes asks respondents to choose the primary reason why refugees abandon their countries among the following alternatives (whose order is also randomized in each interview):

- Flee the war
- Improve their economic conditions
- Avoid political persecution
- Obtain access to social security payments in destination country

We hypothesize that increased capacity for perspective taking will make respondents more likely to attribute refugees' decisions to fleeing the war and avoiding political persecution, rather than seeking economic opportunity and getting access to social security benefits. To reduce noise ([Ansolabehere et al., 2008](#); [Broockman et al., forthcoming](#)), we use the first principal component of all standardized measures as a summary index of support for refugees. Combining responses across multiple items that measure the same latent construct not only reduces bias and variance from random measurement error that is common in survey research, but also alleviates worries about false-positive significance tests by focusing the analysis on two main outcomes. We construct these indices separately for behavioral and attitudinal outcomes. The precise wording and sequencing of all outcome measures, as well as summary statistics (Table [B.1](#)), are presented in the appendix.

Results

The endurance of refugee identity

Our design is based on the assumption that past experiences are successfully transmitted to younger generations through various forms of socialization, among which family socialization plays a crucial role. We examine the extent to which the memory of past forced displacement persists among children and grandchildren of Asia Minor refugees by including a question on

the one event from Greece’s history that respondents consider most crucial for inclusion in Greek history textbooks. Potential answers were five of the most important events or periods of Greece’s modern history, all of which already feature prominently in Greek history curricula: the war of independence (known as the Greek revolution), the Asia Minor catastrophe, the country’s entry into World War II, the civil war, and the military dictatorship of 1967–1974. Figure 3 plots differences in responses between Asia Minor refugee descendants and others in the control group. Descendants are significantly more likely than other respondents to say that the Asia Minor catastrophe should be taught in school. Interestingly, the topic they place less emphasis on is the Greek war of independence. Out of the list of potential responses, this is the one historical event that happened prior to the Asia Minor refugees’ arrival to Greece, and thus does not technically constitute part of their history. Table B.2 in the Appendix presents the regression analog of Figure 3 and demonstrates that the result is robust to a long list of covariates. This lends support to our research strategy because it illustrates the successful transmission of refugee identity to the second and third generation of Asia Minor refugees. We then examine how activating this identity can affect support for asylum seekers.

[Figure 3 about here.]

Priming the parallels of past and present experience

Figure 4 illustrates the main result. When prompted with the similarity of past and present refugee waves, Asia Minor refugee descendants become significantly more friendly and generous toward refugees, as reflected in an increase in both behavioral and attitudinal measures. No effect is observed among respondents without a refugee background. The differential response to the treatment between the two groups of respondents is substantial.

[Figure 4 about here.]

Table 2 presents regression results from the equation specified in 1 for summary measures, with and without the addition of covariates. We cluster standard errors at the prefecture level (number of clusters = 14), to account for the fact that prefectures are our primary sampling unit. Our estimates remain significant when using randomization inference to non-parametrically compute p-values. Specifically, we compare the distribution of t-statistics of interaction coefficients from 10,000 random assignments of individuals to treatment status and report p-values computed as the share of t-statistics with value larger than the t-statistic of the estimated (differential) treatment effect (Gerber and Green, 2012; Young, 2015). Results are shown in Figure B.2 and are similar to those obtained by conventional inference.⁸

[Table 2 about here.]

⁸Table B.3 in the appendix additionally shows that our results are robust to aggregating outcomes using a simple average, instead of the principal component.

Table 3 presents results from the same specification separately for each behavioral outcome. Reference to the parallels between the Asia Minor catastrophe and today’s migrant crisis makes descendants of refugees 7-8 percentage points more likely than other Greeks to donate to the UNHCR and differentially increases their contribution by up to 72%. We can express this result in terms of a “persuasion rate”, i.e. in terms of an estimate of the percentage of receivers who change their behavior, among those who receive a message and are not already persuaded (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007). Among descendants, the effect amounts to a persuasion rate of 15.9%. This rate lies above the 75th percentile of the distribution of effects identified by a large literature on persuasion, which primarily focuses on field interventions (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010). We find a similar large effect on the likelihood of contacting members of parliament to request an increase in the number of people Greece grants asylum to. The only behavioral outcome that does not respond to the treatment is signing a petition to provide improved housing for asylum seekers.

[Table 3 about here.]

Tables 4 and 5 present results for attitudinal measures. These are somewhat noisier, but indicate a similar pattern. Descendants become 8 percentage points more likely to say that refugees have left their countries to flee war, as opposed to leaving to seek economic opportunity or claim social security benefits in the destination country. This indicates that the mention of Asia Minor induces descendants to think of refugees more as forced, and less as economic migrants.

[Table 4 about here.]

[Table 5 about here.]

For all outcomes, the positive differential treatment effect between Asia Minor descendants and others is driven by an increase in sympathy among descendants. Estimates of the coefficient on the treatment dummy indicate that priming the salience of Asia Minor does not have the same effect on native Greeks. Attitudes are essentially unaffected by the treatment, with the exception of support for the inclusion of refugee children in Greek schools, which registers a large and significant increase. It is worth noting at this point that this statement is met with high levels of overall agreement (77% in the control group), but even at this high baseline there is still a substantial difference between Asia Minor descendants and others (the former being 6 p.p. points more likely to either agree or strongly agree with the statement). This is an indication that the lack of a treatment effect among refugees might be the result of a ceiling effect. For behavioral measures, treatment effects for non-descendants are much smaller than for descendants and not statistically significant.

Is the differential response to the treatment driven by analogous thinking about family experience or by other correlates of refugee background? As Table A.1 in the appendix indicates, Asia Minor refugee descendants look broadly similar to the rest of the respondents across most observables, but tend to be slightly older, less likely to be female, more likely to

have a higher family income and less likely to vote for Nea Dimokratia, Greece’s center-right opposition party. To examine whether it is any of these differences that drives the differential response of descendants, we separately estimate the differential effect of the treatment across groups of respondents defined by these and other baseline covariates. The results are shown in Figure 5. The only baseline characteristic that implies a positive and significant treatment effect is refugee background. Differential treatment effects across all other dimensions, including education and occupation, are smaller in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Interestingly, the most precise zero differential effect is estimated for party affiliation, which is a good proxy for baseline attitudes toward immigration and the refugee crisis. Taken together, these results increase our confidence that what we capture is not driven by other characteristics of refugee descendants or by high levels of heterogeneity in the magnitude of the treatment effect.

[Figure 5 about here.]

Salience of family history and sympathy toward outgroups

The previous section indicates that a brief mention of the similarity of experience between the two groups is enough to increase sympathy of Asia Minor descendants toward refugees. Two more findings warrant particular attention. First, the treatment has a systematically larger effect on outcomes for which refugee descendants and other Greeks registered similar baseline levels of sympathy, as measured by the difference in attitudes and behaviors among non-treated respondents. Figure 6 plots side by side, for each individual outcome measure, the differential treatment effect on Asia Minor refugee descendants and the baseline difference between descendants and other respondents in the control group. Outcomes are ordered by the magnitude of the baseline difference. Where initial differences are small, the salience treatment has a large effect on mobilizing higher support among Asia Minor refugee descendants. For dimensions along which descendants were already more sympathetic toward refugees, differential treatment effects are near zero. This suggests that priming the analogy with family experience is particularly successful along those dimensions where bias is more prominent.

[Figure 6 about here.]

Second, we find indication that the applicability of interventions that appeal to the analogy between past and present experience is not limited to groups that directly share such experience in the family, but can also extend to groups indirectly exposed to it in their social environment. We take advantage of a natural source of variation in the degree of past exposure to forced relocation: the magnitude of historical refugee inflows to Greece at the local level. The 1928 Greek census was conducted explicitly to enumerate the forced migrants that arrived from the former Ottoman Empire and provides numbers of refugees by locality. We aggregate these at the modern municipality level and assign the ratio of refugees to the total population in 1928 to the location of our survey respondents (Figure 2 depicts this distribution).

[Figure 7 about here.]

As is shown in Figure 7, the difference in the treatment effect between respondents with refugee ancestors and others is decreasing in the historical share of refugees in the municipality. One interpretation for this finding is that in places with a large historical concentration of forced migrants, the experience of forced displacement – and likely its parallels with the current refugee wave – is already more salient among refugee descendants and thus our treatment fails to affect it. However, Figure 8 shows that the treatment effect is fairly stable across bins of historical refugee share for this group of respondents. At the same time, respondents without refugee ancestors are more positively affected by the treatment in municipalities with a higher share of Asia Minor refugees in 1928.⁹ While this correlation cannot be interpreted as a causal effect, since respondents were not randomly assigned to municipalities with a different historical concentration of Asia Minor refugees, it does suggest that exclusionary attitudes can be changed not just by leveraging analogies with one’s own family history, but also with the history of one’s neighbors and surrounding community.

[Figure 8 about here.]

Conclusion

We examine how the descendants of members of a historical outgroup respond toward a contemporary outgroup undergoing a similar experience as that of their ancestors. We focus on Greece, a country that serves as an entry port to Europe for a large number of refugees, and which, in the early 20th century, experienced a large wave of forced migration that substantially affected its modern-day population composition. Combining historical data with a survey experiment, we show that priming the parallels between past and present experience increases sympathy for contemporary refugees among respondents with a family history of forced migration. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of baseline outgroup bias and spills over to individuals without a refugee background who live in municipalities with a large share of refugee descendants.

While specific in context, our study is of broader relevance for many of the countries that receive large refugee inflows today. Germany, the terminal destination of a majority of refugees making their way into the European Union and the recipient of 45% of total asylum applications filed in the EU since 2015, once received close to 9 million ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe after World War II. These expellees and their descendants constitute today close to 20% of the German population. Similar displacements took place in other parts

⁹The treatment negatively impacts behavioral outcome measures for respondents without a refugee background that live in places with a low historical concentration of Asia Minor refugees. Table A.2 in the appendix indicates that the mention of the Asia Minor Catastrophe, an important event in modern Greek history, also primes national identity among Greeks without a refugee background, which has been shown to positively predict outgroup bias (Mudde, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007).

of Central and Northern Europe in the 20th century. This study illustrates the possibility that intervention campaigns that highlight Europe’s tormented past can have a significant impact on public opinion, that operates not only on descendants of forced migrants, but also on their neighbors. While beyond the scope of the present study, it is not unlikely that priming the family experience of immigration – which many more people share than that of forced relocation – can be a fruitful way of increasing inclusionary attitudes toward immigrants.

On the other hand, context-specificity has implications for the interpretation of our findings. One contextual feature that arises as a possible mediator of the results is that Asia Minor refugees constructed a proud, honorable narrative around their identity as forced migrants, built around the shared memories of a glorified past. Furthermore, rather than challenging the national identity, the refugee identity stood as a subordinate and complementary pillar, strengthening more than undermining self-images of Greek consciousness (Alpan, 2012). An extract from a 1954 speech of a refugee MP illustrates this logic (cited in Voutira, 2003, 149):

Because as refugees, [...], we carried an ancient civilization and we injected new blood in the Greek one, and because we have so totally hellenised northern Greece so that the League of Nations also acknowledged that through the refugee input [...] today northern Greece is 97% Greek [...] Therefore the term refugee is a term of honor and we must insist on it. And not only we, the true refugees, but the children of our children as well.

That the Asia Minor identity is understood by second and third generation descendants of forced migrants to be positive and a source of pride may explain both the baseline sympathy toward Syrian refugees and the positive response to our salience treatment. As suggested by social identity theory, intergroup bias can be motivated by depressed or threatened self-esteem (Hewstone et al., 2002). Conversely, high self-esteem derived by membership in one’s ingroup can be associated with lower prejudice.

Overall, our findings make three contributions to the large social science literature on intergroup bias and prejudice reduction. First, while perspective-taking has been identified as a promising way to reduce bias, few studies exist that demonstrate its effectiveness in a real world setup. Our study does just that in the context of the recent migrant crisis. Second, we shed light on the mechanism through which perspective taking can operate. We show that local memory and family experience can be a powerful mediator of perspective taking, and one that has not been given emphasis in prior literature. Last but not least, our findings extend some of the key insights stemming from the political socialization research. Family, in this literature, is portrayed as the main pillar through which political attitudes and predispositions are initially formed. Recent developments in this literature suggest that the longevity of parental political influence varies according to the centrality of the attribute, with more salient and affect-laden traits persisting, else equal, more than less salient ones (Westholm, 1999). The empirical examination of this argument has tended to distinguish between partisan or ideological identities on the one hand and more specific issue-related attitudes on the other (Jennings et al., 2009). We extend this evidence here by showing that family socialization can transmit enduring identities, formed not along partisan or ideological lines but rather on the basis of life experiences. Importantly, these identities persist even when

the conditions generating them (in this case forced displacement and prejudice) have ceased to apply and, once activated, can color people's predispositions towards other outgroups.

Our study evidences behavioral shifts in response to a minimal manipulation during a telephone interview. We read this fact as an indication that larger real-life interventions have the potential to be even more effective in reducing intergroup hostility and creating connections with outgroups in need.

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
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
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Figure 1. Share of Greek refugees by prefecture in 1928




Source: 1928 Greek census.

Figure 2. Municipalities in sample by historical refugee share




Source: 1928 Greek census and authors' calculations.

Figure 3. Curriculum choices for Greek history books




Notes: The figure plots differences in responses to the question “Which of the following topics do you think should be part of the history curriculum in schools?” between Asia Minor descendants and other respondents in the control group. Outcomes are standardized and point estimates can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations. Dots with horizontal lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.

Figure 4. Effect of priming the analogy with family experience on behaviors and attitudes toward refugees




Notes: Dots with horizontal lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals. Outcome scales are standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the control group and larger values imply higher support for refugees.

Figure 5. Differential treatment effect across subgroups




Notes: The figure plots the difference in the treatment effect on standardized outcomes between groups of respondents indicated on the y-axis. Outcome scales are standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the control group and larger values imply higher support for refugees. Dots with horizontal lines indicate point estimates with cluster-robust 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.

Figure 6. Treatment effect by baseline support for refugees




Notes: Red bars are differences in outcomes between Asia Minor refugee descendants and other respondents in the control group. Blue bars are estimates of the differential treatment effect between Asia Minor refugee descendants and others. All outcomes are recoded so that a positive value represents more sympathetic views toward refugees, and standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the control group. Lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 7. Differential treatment effect by historical share of Asia Minor refugees



Notes: The figure plots the differential treatment effect between respondents with and without refugee ancestors against the historical refugee share in each municipality. *Low*, *Medium*, and *High* denote municipalities with less than 1/3, between 1/3 and 2/3 and above 2/3 Asia Minor refugees in 1928, respectively. Lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The underlying histograms show the distribution of the data across municipalities by share of Asia Minor refugees in 1928.

Figure 8. Treatment effect by historical share of Asia Minor refugees and individual refugee background



Notes: Bars indicate treatment effects and lines represent 90% confidence intervals. *Low*, *Medium*, and *High* denote municipalities with less than 1/3, between 1/3 and 2/3 and above 2/3 Asia Minor refugees in 1928, respectively. The underlying histograms show the distribution of the data across municipalities by share of Asia Minor refugees in 1928.

Table 1. Balancedness

Variable	All	Control	Treatment	Difference
Age	53.191 (12.457)	53.229 (0.405)	53.153 (0.398)	0.076 (0.568)
Female	0.603 (0.489)	0.605 (0.159)	0.600 (0.157)	0.005 (0.022)
Asia Minor descendant	0.489 (0.500)	0.492 (0.016)	0.485 (0.016)	0.008 (0.023)
<u>Education</u>				
Primary	0.989 (0.104)	0.986 (0.004)	0.992 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.005)
Secondary	0.784 (0.411)	0.773 (0.013)	0.795 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.019)
Higher	0.394 (0.489)	0.394 (0.016)	0.394 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.022)
<u>Occupation</u>				
Public employee	0.109 (0.311)	0.102 (0.010)	0.114 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.014)
Private employee	0.144 (0.351)	0.148 (0.012)	0.140 (0.011)	0.016 (0.016)
Pensioner	0.231 (0.422)	0.235 (0.014)	0.228 (0.013)	0.007 (0.019)
Self-employed	0.207 (0.405)	0.210 (0.013)	0.204 (0.013)	0.006 (0.019)
Farmer	0.089 (0.285)	0.095 (0.010)	0.084 (0.009)	0.012 (0.013)
Student	0.002 (0.040)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Homemaker	0.105 (0.307)	0.098 (0.010)	0.111 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.014)
Unemployed	0.106 (0.309)	0.104 (0.010)	0.109 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.014)
<u>Monthly income</u>				
1000 or less	0.563 (0.496)	0.580 (0.016)	0.547 (0.016)	0.033 (0.023)
1000 to 3000	0.412 (0.492)	0.395 (0.016)	0.428 (0.016)	-0.032* (0.023)
Above 3000	0.025 (0.155)	0.024 (0.005)	0.025 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.007)
<u>Voted</u>				
Nea Dimokratia	0.261 (0.439)	0.260 (0.015)	0.261 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.021)
Syriza	0.277 (0.448)	0.270 (0.015)	0.285 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.022)
Pasok	0.058 (0.234)	0.058 (0.008)	0.059 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.011)
ANEL	0.025 (0.157)	0.029 (0.006)	0.021 (0.005)	0.007 (0.008)
Potami	0.028 (0.164)	0.025 (0.006)	0.030 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.008)
KKE	0.041 (0.199)	0.041 (0.007)	0.042 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.010)
Golden Dawn	0.033 (0.179)	0.031 (0.006)	0.035 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.009)

Table 2. Treatment effects: Summary measures

Dep. variable:	PCA behavioral		PCA attitudinal	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Asia Minor	-0.0116 (0.0765)	-0.0156 (0.0733)	0.104 (0.0674)	0.132* (0.0708)
T	-0.0223 (0.0421)	-0.0688 (0.0488)	-0.0299 (0.0628)	-0.0137 (0.0676)
Asia Minor×T	0.186** (0.0681)	0.220*** (0.0693)	0.139* (0.0687)	0.130 (0.0824)
Observations	1510	1439	1611	1535
R-squared	0.00525	0.109	0.00888	0.129
Controls	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: *PCA* is the first principal component of the standardized outcomes. *Asia Minor* denotes respondents with at least one parent or grandparent born in Turkey. Controls include prefecture fixed effects and indicators for gender, age, seven educational categories, seven income categories and eleven occupational categories. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3. Treatment effects: Behavioral outcomes

Dep. variable:	Donate		Log Amount		Petition		Contact MP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Asia Minor	-0.0218 (0.0586)	-0.0182 (0.0583)	-0.00660 (0.0610)	-0.00843 (0.0612)	0.0708 (0.0634)	0.0669 (0.0685)	-0.0728 (0.0734)	-0.0843 (0.0648)
T	-0.0494 (0.0488)	-0.0676 (0.0390)	-0.0411 (0.0484)	-0.0617 (0.0382)	-0.0288 (0.0821)	-0.0467 (0.102)	-0.0117 (0.0408)	-0.0656 (0.0643)
Asia Minor×T	0.154* (0.0760)	0.178** (0.0703)	0.155* (0.0758)	0.180** (0.0705)	-0.0302 (0.123)	0.00197 (0.142)	0.0940* (0.0519)	0.151** (0.0563)
Observations	1739	1651	1739	1651	1758	1671	1734	1645
R-squared	0.00245	0.0895	0.00306	0.0967	0.00134	0.0552	0.000996	0.111
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: *Donate* is a binary indicator for the decision to donate part of 100 euros to the UNHCR. *Log amount* is the logarithm of the amount donated. *Petition* indicates that the respondent agreed to sign a petition for improved housing conditions of refugees in Greece. *Contact MP* equals one if the respondent agreed to eponymously contact a member of parliament and ask for an increase in the numbers of asylum seekers in Greece. All outcomes are standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the control group. *Asia Minor* denotes respondents with at least one parent or grandparent born in Turkey. Controls include prefecture fixed effects and indicators for gender, age, seven educational categories, seven income categories and eleven occupational categories. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4. Treatment effects: Attitudes toward refugees

Dep. Variable	Study in Greek schools		Residence permit		Money to Greeks		Terror threat		Increase crime	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Asia Minor	0.131*	0.116*	0.0151	0.00671	0.122	0.0918	0.121	0.131	0.0530	0.0325
	(0.0623)	(0.0611)	(0.0692)	(0.0618)	(0.0741)	(0.0746)	(0.0768)	(0.0785)	(0.0684)	(0.0847)
T	0.105***	0.164***	-0.0113	-0.0144	-0.00775	-0.00637	0.0213	0.0104	0.00310	-0.0493
	(0.0334)	(0.0412)	(0.0585)	(0.0610)	(0.0496)	(0.0581)	(0.0654)	(0.0738)	(0.0626)	(0.0802)
Asia Minor×T	-0.00279	-0.0494	0.124	0.144	0.0813	0.0820	-0.0743	-0.0645	0.0700	0.106
	(0.0645)	(0.0699)	(0.0838)	(0.0920)	(0.0853)	(0.0743)	(0.0963)	(0.102)	(0.0684)	(0.0708)
Observations	1875	1773	1847	1745	1850	1752	1849	1751	1839	1742
R-squared	0.00725	0.0909	0.00305	0.0850	0.00728	0.129	0.00213	0.0963	0.00260	0.112
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: All outcomes are standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the control group. Items are recoded so that larger values imply a higher support for refugees. *Asia Minor* denotes respondents with at least one parent or grandparent born in Turkey. Controls include prefecture fixed effects and indicators for gender, age, seven educational categories, seven income categories and eleven occupational categories. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5. Treatment effects: Reasons refugees leave their countries

Dep. Variable	Flee war		Economic		Political persecution		Social benefits	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Asia Minor	-0.0338 (0.0526)	0.0151 (0.0618)	0.0516 (0.0638)	0.0591 (0.0714)	0.0781 (0.0773)	0.0570 (0.0783)	-0.0539 (0.0767)	0.000726 (0.0790)
T	-0.117* (0.0619)	-0.0967 (0.0606)	-0.0759* (0.0378)	-0.0647 (0.0442)	0.105 (0.0645)	0.104 (0.0730)	-0.00672 (0.0769)	0.0121 (0.0701)
Asia Minor×T	0.188** (0.0728)	0.181* (0.0875)	0.0800 (0.0604)	0.0861 (0.0538)	-0.0924 (0.101)	-0.0839 (0.123)	0.134 (0.0969)	0.121 (0.0905)
Observations	1768	1680	1768	1680	1768	1680	1768	1680
R-squared	0.00331	0.0784	0.00281	0.0633	0.00152	0.0634	0.00227	0.0730
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y


Notes: Each original outcome equals one if respondents indicated it as the primary reason refugees leave their countries. *Economic* and *Social benefits* are recoded so that higher values indicate a higher support for refugees. All outcomes are standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the control group. *Asia Minor* denotes respondents with at least one parent or grandparent born in Turkey. Controls include prefecture fixed effects and indicators for gender, age, seven educational categories, seven income categories and eleven occupational categories. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A Appendix

Comparing descendants to other respondents

There are few meaningful differences in terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics between Asia Minor refugee descendants and the general population in our sample. As Table A.1 shows, descendants are somewhat older, richer and more likely to vote for the center-left, but they have similar educational and occupational profiles to the rest of the population. We find mixed evidence on whether respondents with refugee ancestors exhibit greater sympathy for refugees than other respondents prior to priming. Figure A.1 illustrates graphically the difference in outcomes between the two groups among untreated respondents. Behavioral outcomes are identical and attitudes are more positive among refugee descendants (by 0.10 standard deviations), but not statistically significant.

Figure A.1. Baseline differences in support for refugees between Asia Minor descendants and others




Notes: The figure plots the estimated difference in outcomes between respondents with at least one refugee parent or grandparent and others in the control group. Outcomes are standardized and point estimates can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations. Lines denote cluster-robust 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.

We additionally provided respondents with a list of groups and asked them which ones they would not like to have as neighbors. The list (whose order was randomized in each interview) included Muslims, Jews, refugees, people of a different race, homosexuals, unmarried couples

living together, heavy drinkers and drug addicts. Answers for each group were binary and Figure A.2 plots the mean answer for all groups excluding refugees, as well as the deviation of the response to the refugee-specific question from the mean answer of each respondent. Estimates correspond to differences in the control group between Asia Minor refugee descendants and others. Descendants are more tolerant on average, but even more so when it comes to refugees. This difference in group-specific tolerance is not explained away by differences in observable characteristics, since estimates are practically identical when including a host of demographic, occupational, educational, income and regional controls. Overall, these comparisons indicate that descendants have a positive latent predisposition toward refugees, but that this does not get expressed in terms of monetary donations or other positive action.

Figure A.2. Groups as neighbors



Notes: *Mean neighbors* is the average response to the question “Could you please tell me for each of these groups if you would or would not like to have them as neighbors?” for the following groups: Muslims, Jews, people of a different race, homosexuals, unmarried couples living together, heavy drinkers and drug addicts. *Difference refugees* indicates the difference of the mean response from the response to the same question asked for refugees. The figure plots estimated differences between Asia Minor descendants and other respondents in the control group. Outcomes are standardized and point estimates can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations. Lines denote cluster-robust 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.

Effects on national identity

We examine whether part of the positive effect on Asia Minor refugee descendants may be a result of the weakening of national (Greek) identity, presumably in favor of refugee identity. We elicited feelings of national identity using two questions. The first one asks respondents to

indicate the importance (in a 4-point Likert scale) of a number of characteristics or groups for a person’s identity and character. We plot the responses for nationality, coded as an indicator that takes on the value one for individuals who consider nationality either important or very important. The second measure asks for the level of agreement with the statement “I am proud to be Greek.” We code as one those individuals that either agree or completely agree with the statement. As shown in Table A.2 the estimated differential treatment effect is negative, though not always statistically significant. This is, however, driven primarily by a strengthening of national identity for respondents without a refugee background, while descendants remain largely unaffected. Consistent with studies that find a positive correlation between nationalism and xenophobia (Mudde, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007), priming the memory of an important event from Greece’s history, strengthens identification with the nation, and thus decreases openness to outgroups.

We also elicited perceptions of past collective victimhood among respondents. We asked individuals to indicate their level of agreement with the statement “Greeks have suffered historically more than other people,” and we assign the value one to those who either agree or completely agree with the statement. Table A.2 shows that the treatment increases perceptions of historical suffering differentially more among Asia Minor refugee descendants. This is consistent with an increase in the salience of refugee identity.

Table A.1. Comparing Asia Minor descendants to other Greeks

Variable	Other respondents	Asia Minor descendants	Difference
Age	52.291 (0.418)	54.006 (0.387)	-1.716** (0.571)
Female	0.616 (0.016)	0.584 (0.016)	0.033 * (0.022)
<u>Education</u>			
Primary	0.987 (0.004)	0.991 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.005)
Secondary	0.775 (0.013)	0.797 (0.013)	-0.022 (0.019)
Higher	0.392 (0.016)	0.397 (0.016)	-0.006 (0.022)
<u>Occupation</u>			
Public employee	0.104 (0.010)	0.115 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.014)
Private employee	0.151 (0.012)	0.136 (0.011)	0.015 (0.016)
Pensioner	0.211 (0.013)	0.254 (0.014)	-0.043 (0.010)
Self-employed	0.214 (0.014)	0.198 (0.013)	0.016 (0.019)
Farmer	0.085 (0.009)	0.092 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.013)
Student	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Homemaker	0.111 (0.010)	0.098 (0.010)	0.012 (0.014)
Unemployed	0.114 (0.010)	0.099 (0.010)	0.014 (0.014)
<u>Monthly income</u>			
1000 or less	0.578 (0.016)	0.545 (0.017)	0.033 (0.023)
1000 to 3000	0.403 (0.016)	0.424 (0.017)	-0.022 (0.023)
Above 3000	0.020 (0.005)	0.031 (0.006)	-0.011* (0.007)
<u>Voted</u>			
Nea Dimokratia	0.280 (0.015)	0.241 (0.015)	0.040* (0.022)
Syriza	0.277 (0.016)	0.277 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.022)
Pasok	0.044 (0.007)	0.073 (0.009)	-0.029** (0.012)
ANEL	0.028 (0.006)	0.024 (0.005)	0.004 (0.008)
Potami	0.028 (0.006)	0.029 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.008)
KKE	0.041 (0.007)	0.042 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.010)
Golden Dawn	0.031 (0.006)	0.035 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.009)

Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Table A.2. National identity and perceptions of historical suffering

Dep. variable:	Identity: nationality		Proud to be Greek		Suffer	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Asia Minor	-0.0202 (0.0799)	0.00670 (0.0876)	0.0929 (0.0704)	0.0733 (0.0861)	-0.144** (0.0558)	-0.145** (0.0622)
T	0.0600 (0.0384)	0.130** (0.0498)	0.0282 (0.0506)	0.00860 (0.0455)	-0.0643 (0.0639)	-0.0569 (0.0651)
Asia Minor × T	-0.126 (0.108)	-0.175* (0.0914)	-0.106 (0.0771)	-0.0933 (0.0707)	0.151** (0.0668)	0.113 (0.0784)
Observations	1867	1770	1889	1787	1876	1778
R-squared	0.00276	0.0955	0.00124	0.0934	0.00262	0.145
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: *Identity: nationality* equals one if the respondent considers nationality to be either important or very important for the identity and character of a person. *Proud to be Greek* equals one if the respondent either agrees or completely agrees with the statement “I am proud to be Greek.” *Suffer* equals one if the respondent either agrees or completely agrees with the statement “Greeks have suffered historically more than other people.” *Asia Minor* denotes respondents with at least one parent or grandparent born in Turkey. Controls include prefecture fixed effects and indicators for gender, age, seven educational categories, seven income categories and eleven occupational categories. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.


B Additional Figures and Tables

Figure B.1. Historical refugee share and share of Asia Minor descendants in the sample



Notes: The figure plots the proportion of Asia Minor descendants in the sample against the share of refugees in 1928 in a prefecture. The red line indicates a linear and the blue line a loess fit. The linear regression line has a slope of 0.570 (p.value = 0.000).

Figure B.2. Randomization inference



Notes: The figure plots, for each of the main summary outcomes, the distribution of t-statistics resulting from 10,000 random assignments of individuals to treatment status. P-values are computed as the share of t-statistics whose value is more extreme than the value of the t-statistic estimated using actual assignment to treatment.

Table B.1. Summary statistics

	Mean	S.D.	N
Donate	0.712	0.453	1765
Amount	54.36	43.32	1765
Log amount	1.662	4.023	1765
Sign petition	0.307	0.462	1783
Contact MP	-0.306	0.624	1758
Study in Greek schools	0.790	0.407	1906
Residence permit	0.438	0.496	1877
Money to Greeks	0.451	0.498	1881
Terror threat	0.559	0.497	1878
Increase crime	0.699	0.458	1868
Reason to leave: flee war	0.756	0.430	1796
Reason to leave: economic	0.124	0.330	1796
Reason to leave: political persecution	0.060	0.237	1796
Reason to leave: social benefits	0.061	0.239	1796
Proud to be Greek	1.425	0.923	1918
Important for identity: religion	2.551	1.248	1897
Important for identity: nationality	2.261	1.198	1897
Important for identity: language	2.111	1.200	1891
Important for identity: gender	1.680	1.039	1871
Important for identity: social class	2.108	1.129	1891
Greeks have suffered more	2.047	1.333	1906
Want as neighbors: Muslims	0.612	0.487	1885
Want as neighbors: Jews	0.761	0.427	1865
Want as neighbors: refugees	0.729	0.445	1855
Want as neighbors: other races	0.823	0.382	1890
Want as neighbors: homosexuals	0.689	0.463	1912
Want as neighbors: unmarried couples	0.915	0.280	1909
Want as neighbors: alcoholics	0.309	0.462	1899
Want as neighbors: drug addicts	0.236	0.425	1899

Table B.2. School curriculum choices: Differences between refugee descendants and other respondents

Dep. variable:	Asia Minor Catastrophe		Greek Revolution		WWII		Civil War		Dictatorship	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Asia Minor	0.466*** (0.0586)	0.475*** (0.0515)	-0.318*** (0.0662)	-0.329*** (0.0739)	-0.0696 (0.0729)	-0.0389 (0.107)	-0.0470 (0.0583)	-0.0907 (0.0829)	-0.0350 (0.0758)	0.00700 (0.105)
Observations	736	710	736	710	736	710	736	710	736	710
R-squared	0.0546	0.183	0.0252	0.193	0.00118	0.144	0.000550	0.131	0.000311	0.174
Controls	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: Each dependent variable is an indicator for respondents who chose the respective topic as an answer to the question “Which of the following topics you think should be part of the history curriculum in schools?” All regressions are estimated in the control group. *Asia Minor* denotes respondents with at least one parent or grandparent born in Turkey. Controls include prefecture fixed effects and indicators for gender, age, seven educational categories, seven income categories and eleven occupational categories. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table B.3. Robustness: Summary measures

Dep. variable:	Average behavioral		Average attitudinal	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Asia Minor	-0.0104 (0.0733)	-0.0134 (0.0642)	0.105 (0.0676)	0.108 (0.0738)
T	-0.0460 (0.0479)	-0.0844 (0.0524)	0.00410 (0.0520)	0.0130 (0.0547)
Asia Minor×T	0.131* (0.0648)	0.177*** (0.0587)	0.108* (0.0547)	0.114* (0.0593)
Observations	1897	1794	1897	1794
R-squared	0.00195	0.0936	0.00787	0.124
Controls	N	Y	N	Y

Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the standardized outcomes. *Asia Minor* denotes respondents with at least one parent or grandparent born in Turkey. Controls include prefecture fixed effects and indicators for gender, age, seven educational categories, seven income categories and eleven occupational categories. Standard errors are clustered at the prefecture level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

C Survey Instrument

Demographics Pt.1

- Q.1 In which year were you born?
- Q.2 Which municipal district do you reside in?
- Q.3 Generally speaking, how interested are you in politics in Greece and in the world more broadly? Would you say you are interested a lot, a fair amount, a little, or not at all?
-

Attitudes toward refugees

- Q.4 Children of asylum seekers in Greece should be allowed to study in Greek schools. (1 = Completely agree; 5 = Completely disagree)
- Q.5 Refugees who live in our country should be granted asylum and residence rights. (1 = Completely agree; 5 = Completely disagree)
- Q.6 The money spent to fund the on-going presence of refugees in Greece could be better spent on the needs of Greeks. (1 = Completely agree; 5 = Completely disagree)
- Q.7 Refugees will increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack in our country. (1 = Completely agree; 5 = Completely disagree)
- Q.8 Refugees in our country are more to blame for crime than other groups. (1 = Completely agree; 5 = Completely disagree)
- Q.9 Which of the following do you believe is the primary reason why refugees abandon their countries? (1 = To flee war; 2 = To improve their economic conditions; 3 = To avoid political persecution; 4 = To obtain access to social security payments in the destination country.)
-

Other social groups

- Q.10 I will now mention various groups of people. Could you please tell me for each of these groups if you would or would not like to have them as neighbors? (Muslims, Jews, refugees, people of a different race, homosexuals, unmarried couples living together, heavy drinkers, drug addicts)
-

Identity

- Q.11 How important do you think the following characteristics are for the identity and character of a person? Use a scale in which 1 means not important, 2 means slightly important, 3 means quite important and 4 means very important. (Religion, nationality, gender, social class)
- Q.12 Can you tell me if you completely agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or completely disagree, with the following statement: I am proud to be Greek.
- Q.13 Which of the following topics you think should be part of the history curriculum: the 1821 Greek revolution, the Asia Minor catastrophe, the “No” of Metaxas to the Italians in WWII, the civil war, the dictatorship.
-

Victimhood

- Q.14 Can you tell me if you completely agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or completely disagree, with the following statement: Greeks have suffered historically more than other people.
-

Voting behavior

Cont.

Q.15 Did you vote in the last elections of September 2015? (If *Yes*) Which party did you vote for?

Behavior toward refugees

Q.16 Before concluding our interview, I would like to inform you that as part of the survey we raffle off a 100 euro voucher. Every respondent has an equal chance of winning the voucher. However, you can also choose to donate a percentage of your winnings to the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). If you win the voucher, the donation amount will be deducted from the voucher. Would you like to donate some part of the 100 euros voucher, and if so, how much?

Q.17 Over the last months, different groups of citizens collected signatures to push the government to provide housing for asylum seekers in hostels and hospitality centers instead of open-air asylum camps. Would you like to sign this petition? This information notice would contain your name and location. (Yes/No)

Q.18 Should we inform the Members of Parliament on your behalf whether you want to increase or decrease the number of people Greece grants asylum to? This information notice would contain your name and location. (1 = Greatly increase; 4 = Greatly decrease)

Demographics Pt. 2

Q.19 Which is the highest level of education you have attained?

Q.20 Occupation

Q.21 Net monthly household income

Q.22 Where were you born? (1 = Macedonia; 2 = Rest of Greece; 3 = Asia Minor or Pontus or Istanbul)

Q.23 Where was your father born? (1 = Macedonia; 2 = Rest of Greece; 3 = Asia Minor or Pontus or Istanbul)

Q.24 And do you remember where your father's parents were born? (1 = At least one in Asia Minor, Pontus or Istanbul; 2 = Both in Asia Minor, Pontus or Istanbul; 3 = Both in Asia Minor or Pontus or Istanbul)

Q.25 Where was your mother born? (1 = Macedonia; 2 = Rest of Greece; 3 = Asia Minor or Pontus or Istanbul)

Q.26 And do you remember where your mother's parents were born? (1 = At least one in Asia Minor, Pontus or Istanbul; 2 = Both in Asia Minor, Pontus or Istanbul; 3 = Both in Asia Minor or Pontus or Istanbul)
