

# **THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN ATHENS: DEVELOPING INDICATORS AND STATISTICAL MEASURES**

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## 1) RATIONALE

By 2001, Greece was confirmed as a country with a substantial immigrant population, most of whom had arrived within the previous ten years. The 2001 Census recorded 797.000 persons without Greek citizenship, of whom approximately 650-700.000 were third country nationals without claim to Greek ethnicity. By 2003, there were some 130.000 foreign children in state schools (of which, 32.000 were ethnic Greeks), constituting 11% of primary school registers and 8% of secondary school registers.

According to the latest Census and other available records, just under half of Greece's immigrants live in the metropolis of Athens (Attika); some 206.000 Albanians (444.000 throughout Greece) actually have Attika as their recorded place of residence, constituting 55% of immigrants in the region, the same ratio as for the whole of the country. Furthermore, the immigrant/population ratio for Attika is around 11% as compared with 7,3% for Greece, with over 80% of immigrants coming from less-developed countries. Thus, Athens, like all immigrant cities of the world, now has an urgent obligation to evaluate, record and legislate in order to manage its new and large immigrant population.

The purpose of this Report is essentially threefold:

- To present available statistical and other indicators of immigrant integration in Athens
- To devise a framework of analysis for the evaluation of such indicators
- To identify areas where the data are either missing or of low quality

Armed with such information, we hope then to be able to make a strong case for the establishment of a permanent Observatory on immigrant integration in Athens. Only with high quality statistics, reports and evaluations can policy makers and NGOs respond to manage the inevitably difficult transition that Greece, and in particular Athens, is experiencing in adapting to, and hosting, a large new immigrant population.

In this Report, I first of all look at definitional problems concerning immigrant integration, along with recent EU policy initiatives. Following this, Section 3 presents some of the major scientific knowledge on the matter – almost all of which is derived from North American and Northern European experiences. In Section 4, I advance a framework for the analysis of data, using a temporal approach with three stages of integration. Seven broad areas of immigrant integration are posited, along with suggested statistical and other indicators. Section 5 identifies the available indicators for Athens or Greece; the quality of the data; and missing or incomplete data. Finally, in the concluding section, a provisional evaluation is made of the state of progress of immigrant integration, along with the development needed of statistical and other indicators.

## 2) ISSUES IN MONITORING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

### *(a) The concept of immigrant integration*

There is no single definition of what exactly is meant by the integration of immigrants. Various academic authors stress different aspects of integration, partly through their different scientific emphases, and sometimes through different conceptualisations of what sort of process it should be. This latter point is nowhere more evident than in the historically different national discourses across the European Union relating to *how* immigrants should be integrated into society. Most recently, the term **social cohesion** has been used almost synonymously with integration (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003: 6), at least in the sense that societies with high levels of social cohesion are necessarily those whose immigrant populations are well-integrated.

One definition advanced by the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) of the EU is that of civic integration, “based on bringing immigrants’ rights and duties, as well as access to goods, services and means of civic participation progressively into line with those of the rest of the population, under conditions of equal opportunities and treatment” (ESC, 2002: 1).

The European Commission, in a recent Communication, suggests that “integration should be understood as a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant (CEC, 2003: 17).

Another definition, offered by an academic analyst, is that integration is the “process by which immigrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups” (Penninx, 2003). By this definition, the nature of the receiving society is a crucial determinant in a complex equation, involving a wide range of actors – immigrants themselves, the host government, institutions, and local communities. According to this analysis, the unequal distribution of power between the host society and the immigrants means that it is the host society which has the greater say in the determination of outcomes.

The problem with all of these definitions, and others, is that they fail to encapsulate the sheer complexity and diversity of the phenomenon known as integration of immigrants. Below, I develop a temporal framework of variegated integration, which not only encompasses a chronology of integration issues and processes, but also allows for the different types of integration which have been observed by different immigrant groups, and

within different societies. Without such a framework, it is impossible even to draw meaningful conclusions from evidence and data, let alone progress to policy recommendations.

*(b) Who is an immigrant?*

Clearly, a key issue in looking at immigrant integration is some sort of common definition of who is an immigrant. This is lacking across the EU, for a variety of reasons:

- i. Possession of host country nationality.** Many immigrants actually possess the nationality of their host country and are not even recorded as immigrants. This is particularly evident in the case of migrants from former colonies of the UK, France and Netherlands, *inter alia*. National statistics may obscure the realities of these migrations, and understate the need for immigrant integration measures.
- ii. Acquisition of host country nationality.** Most northern EU countries grant citizenship fairly easily after 5 years or so, thereby removing such immigrants from statistical data unless other provisions of record are made. On the other hand, EU countries with *ius sanguinis*<sup>1</sup> [Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain] leave entire populations of migrants' children, i.e. second and third generation migrants, recorded as immigrants in the countries in which they were actually born. In addition, Southern EU countries have become increasingly reluctant to award citizenship to immigrants (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997), thus leaving their immigrant populations more visible.
- iii. "Ethnic migrants".** Such migrants, notably *Aussiedler*<sup>2</sup> going to Germany and *homogeneis*<sup>3</sup> going to Greece from Pontos in Russia, are given special status and are treated as non-immigrants, even though they are in need of integration assistance as much as other migrants.

Taking these three categories together, the effect over time is to obscure the realities of migration and hinder comparative analysis. In particular, the number of immigrants is understated in the UK and France, and overstated in Germany and southern Europe. Furthermore, the presence of 'ethnic migrants' in Germany and Greece results in an additional distortion of data: second or even third generation migrants born in the host country (and often well integrated) are considered aliens, whereas recent immigrants with

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<sup>1</sup> Citizenship attribution through parental nationality, as opposed to place of birth.

<sup>2</sup> Ethnic Germans

<sup>3</sup> Ethnic Greeks

claims to German or Greek ethnicity are not considered to be aliens. Some EU countries, such as Denmark and Holland, record not only foreign nationals, but also the foreign born, as well as the children of foreign born, in order to monitor social integration (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003: 39). Other countries do not do so, many on the grounds of intrusiveness.

In the case of Greece, ethnic Greeks (*homogeneis*) from Russia are recipients of special integration measures and rapid naturalisation procedures; ethnic Greeks from elsewhere are generally denied integration assistance and required to apply through normal procedures for Greek nationality. Ethnic Greeks from Albania are currently denied Greek nationality as policy. All persons registered as ethnic Greeks are given a special 3-year *homogeneis* card by the Ministry of Public Order, which refuses to disclose the number of such permit holders or their nationalities. Furthermore, the 2001 Census data, although theoretically recording *homogeneis* as non-Greeks, seem to be doubtful on this matter.

In conclusion, we can say that immigrants claiming Greek ethnicity are obscured in many statistical data, whereas immigrant children either born in Greece or who migrated at an early age, are recorded as aliens. Ethnic Greeks from Pontos are specifically privileged with financial and other assistance for integration purposes (as are the so-called “returning Greeks” from USA and elsewhere), whilst up till now there have been no integration programmes for immigrants without Greek ethnicity. This discriminatory situation is regarded as unsatisfactory by most non-Greek commentators (see e.g. ECRI 2004), not least because it results from recent government policy choices rather than constitutional obligation.

### *(c) EU policy on integration of immigrants*

As noted in a recent European Parliament Report, it is only since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 that the European Commission has had strong powers to propose legislation on immigration and treatment of third country nationals (EP, 2003: 9). In one area – the integration of immigrants – the Commission felt that it had not proposed sufficient legislation, and therefore issued in 2003 a Communication addressed to the other European Union institutions (CEC, 2003).

This Communication, for the first time, attempts to grapple with the difficult issue of immigrant integration within the European Union. It advocates a holistic approach, with six main elements to be included in formulating a policy strategy (CEC, 2003: 19):

- Integration into the labour market
- Education and language skills
- Housing and urban issues
- Health and social services
- The social and cultural environment
- Nationality, civic citizenship and respect for diversity

However, one might comment that the coverage is far from holistic as it fails to address some of the fundamental problems faced by immigrants in Greece and other Southern European countries. In particular, it is not cognisant of bureaucratic impediments to lawful residence, poor observance of national and other laws by state authorities, discrimination on the grounds of nationality, and longer term issues faced by second generation migrants (such as access to long-term residence, voting rights and citizenship).

Notwithstanding these criticisms, most of which derive from the constrained legal competence of the Commission in these matters, some progress has been made with EC legislation furthering immigrants' rights within the European Union. The most important of these is undoubtedly the **Directive on long-term residence**, passed in November 2003;<sup>4</sup> this directive was the result of a detailed and impressive report published in 2000 (Groenendijk *et al.*, 2000) which suggested that a high degree of convergence of practices for the granting of permanent residence permits had already occurred in the EU, with that status usually awarded after 5 years. However, the same Report notes the problems of stringent requirements in all southern European countries for acquiring long-term residence permits, and the award of precisely zero such permits in the case of Greece.

Also of importance are the **Directive on family reunification**,<sup>5</sup> passed in September 2003 and **Regulation 895/2003**<sup>6</sup> passed in May 2003, extending to third country nationals Regulations 1408/71 and 574/72, concerning social insurance transferability between EU national systems. However, both directives [family reunification; long-term residence] need incorporation into national laws, which is not required before October 2005 and January 2006, and may well take considerably longer.

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<sup>4</sup> Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November, 2003, concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents.

<sup>5</sup> Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003, on the right to family reunification.

<sup>6</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No. 859/2003, of 14 May 2003, extending the provisions of Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 and Regulation No. 574/72 to nationals of third countries who are not already covered by those provisions solely on the ground of their nationality.

Finally, we should mention the **non-discrimination directives** of 2000.<sup>7</sup> The first of these addresses discrimination generally on the grounds of race and ethnic origin; the second, discrimination in employment on the grounds of race and ethnic origin, religion, religious belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. These required implementation in 2003, and still neither has been enacted in Greece. Furthermore, they do not cover discrimination specifically on the grounds of nationality, which some commentators believe to make them nugatory (e.g. Hepple, 2004).

*(d) Monitoring immigrant integration*

The previously-mentioned 2002 ESC Report suggests the inauguration of a **monitoring system**, through which the results of social integration policies could be assessed. Such a system should have qualitative and quantitative indicators, the task of defining specific objectives and laying down practical action plans (ESC, 2002: 8).

A recent report for the European Commission, *Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration* (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003), attempts to develop such indicators. For various reasons, discussed in detail below, their methodology is fraught with problems of comparability and interpretation of data. Almost all of these problems stem from the very different national contexts across the EU, and a lack of harmonisation of approaches to policy. Across the EU, highly divergent general institutional frameworks for education, labour market, vocational training and social policy impact differently on immigrant groups. The latest academic thinking is that these overall structures are far more important in facilitating or impeding immigrant integration than are targeted measures (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004a; Crul and Vermeulen, 2003).

Thus, statistical indicators and other measures of immigrant integration need to be carefully located and analysed in each specific national – and maybe even local – context, even though overall policy objectives could be set at the level of the European Union. The challenge of a project such as this is therefore twofold:

- To collect appropriate, reliable qualitative and quantitative data
- To develop an analytic framework within which such data can be exploited

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<sup>7</sup> Dir. 2000/43/EC and Dir. 2000/78/EC



### 3) SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION

#### *(a) The European experiences of immigration and integration*

In Europe, and to some extent the USA, there has been until recently a primary focus on the nation state and also on national policy as the principal determinant of trajectories or types of immigrant integration. These different patterns of immigrant incorporation were thought to consist of the traditional immigration countries of the “New World”, the post-war immigration countries of Northern Europe, and the exclusionary countries of the Middle and Far East, for example. Within Europe itself, various typologies of immigrant integration have been suggested. These include patterns based on the citizenship/immigration nexus, within which the mechanism of citizenship attribution [*ius soli* or *ius sanguinis*]<sup>8</sup> is viewed as either a determinant or a symptom of a particular societal value system in dealing with newcomers. In this particular paradigm, France is posited as the “assimilationist” nation state (Hollifield, 1997); the UK as tolerating ethnic minorities as permanent residents (Rex, 1991) and Germany as the “temporary guestworker” state, which until recently denied that Germany was a country of immigration (Brubaker, 1992). Similar inductive models can be found in many works, with various labels such as “differential exclusion”, “assimilationist” and “pluralist” (Castles, 1995).

These models are now looking less and less useful, for a variety of reasons. First, they imply fixed or, at least, inertial civic conceptions, which are deemed unlikely to change significantly; secondly, they exist at the national or country level, with no regard for regional or urban/rural differences; and thirdly, they focus upon ideology and legal formulations, rather than other tangible outcomes. Recent work has tended to suggest convergence of immigrant integration patterns in Europe (Niessen, 2000; Heckmann, 1999: 23); the existence of major regional or city variations, extending way beyond most visible national differences (Koff, 2002; Alexander, 2003); and some questioning of the relevance of such abstract models and the research questions being asked (Vermeulen, 2004). However, we should not be misled by the observation that different *national ideological* patterns of immigrant integration policy seem to have produced comparable outcomes. *Structural differences*, for example in the bureaucratic approach to managing legal residence, or the education system, or regulation of the labour market, appear to be crucial in determining different outcomes in specific policy areas (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003).

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<sup>8</sup> *ius soli* is attribution of citizenship by birthplace; *ius sanguinis* by parental nationality.

Vermeulen (2004: 31-3), rehearsing the arguments of Portes and others, talks about "modes of integration" relevant to different ethnic groups within a society. These are:

- *Classical assimilation*, in which immigrant groups after several generations of upward social mobility lose their cultural distinctiveness. Effectively, the ethnic group disappears for most social purposes. Although now challenged, on the grounds of existing only for highly educated migrants, there are recent defences of its general applicability (Waldinger and Feliciano, 2004).
- *Underclass formation*, where social mobility is low and immigrants over several generations remain stuck at a low level of education, employment and social status.
- *Integration through ethnic communities*, in which the self-sufficiency of distinct ethnic groups [e.g. Greeks or Jews] usually with strong entrepreneurial skills, locates them in separate economic and social niches. Although crude economic indicators may suggest a high level of integration of workers in such a community, their integration is actually within ethnic economies and is accompanied by lack of social inclusion in the mainstream society.

These modes are not models of integration: they apply to specific ethnic groups rather than to receiving societies, and may indeed be more linked with the migrants' pre-migration histories rather than characteristics of the receiving society. Clearly, such an analysis challenges the primacy of the institutional modes and operation of receiving societies, and attaches much more importance than previously to the behaviour of migrant groups.

What should be apparent here, is that the integration of immigrants is a complex phenomenon: it occurs over an extended period of time; has multiple actors and variables; and is a multi-faceted process, requiring serious and detailed analysis. Thus, the previously-accepted national models of integration in Europe now appear simplistic if not erroneous, and the search is on for new analytical explanations of immigrant integration.

*(b) Ethnic entrepreneurship as an integration strategy*

Self-employment, and particularly with strong links to ethnic communities or enclaves, has been viewed as a successful strategy in the USA (Lofstrom, 2002; Kloosterman and Rath, 2001); it is, however, linked with an integration type of ethnic community formation, as identified above. In the UK, ethnic entrepreneurship has not been seen as a successful

strategy by minorities (Clark and Drinkwater, 2002), at least in terms of employment outcomes. Across the EU, however, there is much support for policy-makers to encourage ethnic businesses and self-employment, from both political activists and immigrant NGOs (Cormack and Niessen, 2002).

Recent research in Europe has started to emphasise the important role of self-employment for immigrant and other excluded groups, not so much in simple labour market terms but also as a self-empowerment strategy (Kupferberg, 2003; Apitzsch, 2003). Even though exclusion from the labour market is often the original motivation for self-employment (for example, 25-30% of ethnic entrepreneurs in Sweden had previously been unemployed (Alund, 2003: 84)), the gains from setting up one's own business extend further. More claims on resources, and a strengthened negotiating position in the local space, are important gains for those formerly considered to be second class citizens (Kupferberg, 2003: 90), despite the fact that "path-dependency" [i.e. previous labour market situation] might determine success or failure in the businesses themselves. Thus, for marginalised immigrants, ethnic entrepreneurship is as much to do with social integration as with making money from the business activities; thus the failure of a new business would not necessarily mean complete failure of the venture.

### *(c) Recent Comparative Approaches to Immigrant Integration*

Koff (2002), looking at immigrants in Italy and France, tries to operationalize an empirical and theoretical challenge to much of the existing literature on immigrant integration. He takes as his starting point the idea that immigrants are not passive recipients of integration policies, nor even weak social actors overwhelmed by host country structures and institutions. Rather, Koff posits immigrants as rational political actors competing for a 'just' distribution of resources, albeit within settings of varying ideologies and political culture. This meso-analysis, located at city level, then tries to address the interaction of rationality, institutions and cultural variables.

Despite some methodological problems, this approach has much to commend it. The focus on cities [Bari, Florence, Toulouse and Lille] captures more precisely the localised political environment within which immigrants compete for resources. Although it is national policies that regulate statuses such as residence permits, family migration and naturalization, it is at the local level that immigrants work, live, and perhaps integrate. Looking at four domains of

political integration, economic integration, housing, and public security, Koff finds massive variation between the cities. Indeed, the variation between cities in the same country exceeds that between countries, again questioning the relevance of national patterns or policies. Furthermore, there appears to be little relationship between scores in different domains: for example, Lille has very high political integration of its immigrant population, but poor housing integration or economic integration; Florence scores highly on economic, political and housing integration, and worst on public security. In other words, there are no common patterns of integration to be found, at least at this level of analysis. The big deficit of this approach is its lack of differentiation by ethnic group and inattention to generational issues of the immigrants. It is possible that different results would pertain with more detailed investigation.

Another approach taken recently, is that adopted by Alexander (2003). As in much of the recent literature, he looks at policy at the local level and proposes a typology of host-stranger relations drawn from empirical material covering 25 cities, including Athens, Rome, Turin, Barcelona, Marseilles, Lille, and Tel-Aviv. His typology is to a great extent replicative of the older nation-state models of 'guestworker', 'assimilationist' and 'pluralist', with the innovation of a new category he names "transient": it is this category of 'non-policy' which is of interest, since it is derived from the literature on Amsterdam in the 1960s, Rome in the 1980s, Tel-Aviv in the 1990s and contemporary Athens. This *Transient* attitude, he claims, is typical of local authorities in the first phase of labour migration, when the immigrant population is small and many of them are undocumented. Migrant workers are regarded as a transient phenomenon and the responsibility of the national state: avoidance of responsibility characterises the local state, although some "street-level bureaucrats" may have a radically different view from the official one (Alexander, 2003: 419). The (non-) strategy of the local state is to ignore migrant associations and black economy activity; to allow migrant children access to schools and healthcare on an *ad hoc* basis; to ignore *ad hoc* places of worship, housing issues and ethnic enclaves; and to treat migrants as a public security problem when necessary. The policy stance is essentially reactive and limited to specific crises; clearly, it is unsustainable over an extended period and will ultimately shift to another more goal-oriented stance.

#### *(d) Integration Policy Choices*

Vermeulen (2004: 27-8) identifies three major dimensions of integration: structural, socio-cultural and identity. The central goal of the first is equality of opportunity, namely equal access to education, housing, employment and the political system. The second (socio-cultural), which he considers to be more controversial, addresses the choice of homogeneity versus heterogeneity. This policy choice can lead to pluralist toleration or multicultural social order, as compared with assimilation or non-tolerance of cultural and ethnic difference. There are, of course, many possible varieties of this mix of homogeneity versus heterogeneity: few European countries are completely intolerant of ethnic difference, or completely accepting of all difference. The third dimension, identity, is linked with the second, but focused on inclusion versus exclusion. A good example is given by religion: acceptance of Islam as a religion of the country concerned would be clear inclusion, whereas mere toleration of it would not be.

#### *(e) Characterising the Process of Integration*

The integration of immigrants into a host society is a hotly-contested issue (Vermeulen, 2004: 27), yet is generally regarded by policymakers throughout the EU as a legitimate objective of public policy – often with yet another nametag, “social cohesion”, attached to it (CEC, 2003: 4). However, the actual phenomenon of integration occurs regardless of public policy; its operation is non-transparent and with diverse mechanisms and areas of interaction, and generally so complex as to yield an unlimited number of diverse analyses and explanations.

For the above reasons, I suggest here a temporal hierarchy of integration issues, or ‘**Stages of Integration**’, which are intended to represent the different sorts of obstacles and problems faced by immigrants in the ‘migrant life-cycle’ (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004a: 324-9).

These stages I classify as:

- Stage 1: residence and employment
- Stage 2: family grouping and settlement
- Stage 3: formation of ethnic communities and/or assimilation

Although in reality, there is not such clear-cut differentiation of issues for each stage, it is convenient to classify the following as belonging to Stage 1: legal residence, labour market and housing issues. Stage 2 consists of: education, health and social services, and social

integration. For the last stage, there are the issues of nationality acquisition, civic citizenship and toleration of difference by the host society.

Within each of these stages, we would expect to see different outcomes for each immigrant group – the ‘segmented integration’ model. Some migrant groups may apparently integrate easily (even assimilate), others may be held back through socio-economic status and low educational and employment opportunities, and yet others may find ethnic community support in entrepreneurial ventures. These three types of integration correspond to Vermeulen’s modes: however, it is not inevitable that this typology will apply in Greece. Therefore, it is important to reserve the possibility of other types of integration, which could be specific to Greece or southern Europe more generally.

There are no commonly agreed objective indicators relating to the process of integration of immigrants, and, for that matter, no obvious end to the process (Koff, 2002). It is debatable whether it can even be studied for recent migrants, and most of the significant literature is based on turn of the century European migrations to the USA and the integration of second and third generation immigrants there. Even for northern European immigration countries, there are scarcely enough ‘native-born foreigners’ [the true ‘second generation’] for study. This has led to the invention of quasi-second generation immigrants, identified as 1.25, 1.5 and 1.75 generation for foreign-born children arriving at the ages of >12, <12, and <6 respectively (Rumbaut, 1997). Within southern Europe, although most immigration has occurred since the 1980s, there are older labour and political migrations of certain ethnic groups. These include Argentinians in Spain (Gomez, 1998: 2), Egyptians and Ethiopians in Italy (Andall, 2002: 392) and Egyptians in Greece (Fakiolas and King, 1996). Although these groups would be ideal studies of immigrant integration processes of the second generation, there appears not to have been such research undertaken.

#### 4) A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR STATISTICAL AND QUALITATIVE DATA

This framework is a preliminary attempt to characterise over time the major issues facing immigrants seeking to “fit into” the society, rather than as temporary labour migrants. Using three ‘stages of integration’ in the migrant life-cycle, indicators of integration should be developed for each major immigrant group. This means collecting a lot of data for countries with diverse immigrant populations, since each immigrant group is likely to have quite different characteristics.

##### **STAGE ONE: residence and employment**

The predominant issues here relate to legal integration, the labour market and housing. For families with children, there may also be an immediate issue with schooling.

##### Legal Integration

We start here with an issue which rarely pertained with older migrations: the status of immigrants themselves upon arrival. It is crucial to the future path of integration exactly how each immigrant is received and classified: An illegal immigrant? An asylum-seeker? A family member? An ethnic migrant “repatriating” to his/her homeland? A skilled professional worker? A student or visitor? Each of these statuses carries its own baggage and locates the migrant on a particular initial trajectory. As one analyst notes:

immigrants have first of all to negotiate their right to reside, as this is a necessary prerequisite for all other rights they might later seek to obtain...It is only when this issue (legal status) has been successfully resolved that immigrants can go on to negotiate over other important issues, such as political, social or socio-economic participation rights or cultural rights... (Kupferberg, 2003: 90)

A similar position is adopted by Duran Ruiz (2003) in the case of Spain, and Baldwin-Edwards (2004b: 20) for southern Europe generally. Thus, the successful negotiation and retention of legal status is a major first step in integration. **Suitable indicators** would be: the ratio of residence permits to recorded migrant populations; the length of continuous residence by nationality; the extent of expulsions for illegal residence; duration of residence permits; proportion of immigrants with permanent residence rights; access to family reunification rights.

### Labour Market

Employment is usually considered an important indicator of immigrant integration for a variety of reasons. First of all, not only for financial but also for social reasons, a job is a crucial mechanism for immigrant integration. (In Greece, an additional factor is that loss of employment leads almost automatically to suspension of legal residence (Psimmenos and Kassimati, 2003).) Secondly, the nature of employment compared with the migrant's skills, education and training, is a good measure of structural discrimination or exclusion from parts of the labour market. Thirdly, data on level of earnings, adjusted for socio-economic background, are also a measure of the extent of integration. Other factors which need to be considered are: periods of unemployment (and access to unemployment benefits on equal terms with nationals); social insurance contributions, which should be gauged relative to employers' propensity to insure Greek workers; extent of participation in the informal economy; and membership of trade unions. Finally, self-employment or 'ethnic entrepreneurship' is an important strategy, which appears to have taken off recently in Athens, although data on this are almost non-existent.

### Housing

Accommodation is another crucial area for assessing immigrant integration into a society. The major issues are: legal rights, relative to nationals (including access to state subsidised housing); discrimination in the rented housing market, e.g. refusal to rent, or charging higher rents; urban segregation or formation of ethnic ghettos; housing conditions, such as persons per room, space per person, quality of housing (access to hot water, inside toilet, etc).

### **STAGE TWO: family grouping and settlement**

This stage of the migrant life-cycle is concerned with the family unit, and therefore with the needs of family members, especially children. It also has implications for female employment, as women will be less inclined to participate in the labour market. In the case of Greece, the very limited opportunities for part-time employment means that immigrant mothers will probably work in the informal economy.



### Education and language skills

Access to all levels of schooling, regardless of parental status, is essential. Special classes in Greek language acquisition are needed for most immigrant children, and IMLI<sup>9</sup> is desirable for children to be able to migrate to their country of nationality, even if they were not born there. The success rates of migrant children (adjusted for socio-economic class) are central in evaluating integration progress. Other issues, for adults, include recognition of foreign school certificates, diplomas and degrees (by DIKATSA); and access to higher education. For all of these issues, structural patterns of state bureaucracy may impact very differently on different migrant groups: for example, some migrant groups' families may provide better quality help with children's homework, leaving others at a disadvantage.

### Health and Social Services

Given the relatively underdeveloped nature of these in Greece, it is not clear how immigrants will interact with such structures. Although membership of state social insurance schemes such as IKA or TEVE is one clear indicator, much of the Greek population eschews state medical care. Immigrant participation in private medical care is not recorded, and is a relevant indicator. Another indicator, which is available, is free medical assistance by NGOs such as *Médecins du Monde*: however, this is more an indicator of exclusion than of integration. Other social services are relevant, although information on their provision is available only for recognised refugees.

### Social and cultural integration

This is a broad area, and includes the provision of state or municipal cultural centres; the existence and social activities of migrant associations; general cultural activities and how included foreign communities are in Greek social life; newspapers, television and radio (again, how inclusive are the Greek media; the existence of foreign press or foreign language tv); the relative crime rates of immigrant groups *vis-à-vis* Greeks; and the extent and significance of mixed marriages. We might also include here, the behaviour of state authorities, such as the police, social insurance agencies, in dealing with immigrants. Most of the indicators for these will be qualitative, and needing careful interpretation. Here, the above-mentioned analysis of Vermeulen on policy objectives could prove useful.

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<sup>9</sup> Immigrant Minority Language Instruction

### **STAGE THREE: formation of ethnic communities and/or assimilation**

This stage has been reached by few immigrants in Greece, but is worth recording if only to note a distinct lack of progress so far. As previously mentioned, there are some immigrants who have reached second generation and 1,5 generation in Athens: their experiences have not been systematically recorded, but the existing structures (such as annual or biennial residence permits over a period of decades; lack of voting rights; constrained and costly naturalisation procedures) suggest that exclusion is the norm, rather than integration.

The indicators which are most relevant are: naturalisation data; political participation; local voting rights (which are common across the EU, as suggested by the Council of Europe convention on local voting rights for migrants); the existence of formal immigrant bodies for consultation with the central and local state; religious freedoms and practices, including buildings for worship.

## 5) INDICATORS FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN ATHENS

### STAGE 1 INDICATORS: residence and employment

#### *(a) Legal integration*

The only reliable source of data concerning the number and nationalities of immigrants in Greece is the 2001 Census. This recorded illegal as well as legal migrants, and did not ask any question on legal status. It did record nationality, although without asking for documentation: there is, therefore, some doubt over whether some ethnic Greeks without Greek nationality were counted as Greeks or not. No data were collected on ethnicity, religion or languages spoken – unusually, for a European census.

Table A1 gives three sources of data: aliens recorded in the 2001 Census, with the top 49 nationalities by gender; applications for the first legalization in 1998; and the latest available data on valid residence permits, 2004. From the Census data can be seen the primacy of Albanian immigrants, followed by three other Balkan nationalities, and then by three other nationalities of which large proportions are probably ethnic Greeks (Americans, Cypriots and Russians). Ethnic Greeks are not subject to the same immigration rules, and are awarded a three-year *homogeneis* card by the Ministry of Public Order: this ministry refuses to give out any information on the total number of *homogeneis* cards or the nationalities concerned. Comparable information on *homogeneis* without Greek nationality should be available from the Census, but again seems to be suppressed.

The third set of data in **Table A1** should somehow correlate with the other two sets, in that all foreigners over 18 require a residence permit. However, two other immigration regimes apply, concerning EU/EFTA nationals (and their family members) and ethnic Greeks. **Table A2** shows the age distribution of immigrants in the 2001 Census, unfortunately not by nationality, giving 127.000 immigrant children under the age of 15 and perhaps another 30.000 aged 15-17. It is not possible, though, to know how to adjust the Census data to correlate with the permit data. The final two columns of **Table A1** show the ratios of permits to legalization applications, and to Census data. Typically, the ratios are 60-80% and 30-60% respectively. In the case of Albanians, the lower figures *may* be caused by ethnic Greek Albanians in the two other datasets, along with a much larger proportion of children; on the other hand, they may be caused by extreme difficulties faced by Albanian workers in certain economic sectors in renewing their work and residence permits [see below]. Other

nationalities with very low numbers of permits compared with their presence in two other datasets are: Polish, Iraqi, Filipino, Syrian, Nigerian, Ethiopian, and Sri Lankan. With the exception of Iraqis, these are labour migration nationalities and the low ratios of permits should be a cause of great concern, especially as the Polish, Filipino and Ethiopians constitute some of the older immigrant communities in Greece, with well-established civic networks and social life.

Of the other nationalities with very low ratios of permits to Census data, some are clearly composed of many ethnic Greeks: Russian, South African, Turkish, and possibly Egyptian, Armenian and Brazilian. However, the situation has been made so complex through the lack of information by the Greek state, that it is almost impossible to reach any conclusions based on official data. It is also evident that the Greek state itself has no idea of how many immigrants need permits, how long they have been in Greece or much else at all.

Immigrants' duration of residence in Greece is a matter of some importance. Very few immigrants have been able to acquire and retain legal status<sup>10</sup>, so necessarily much of this residence is without a permit. **Chart A1** gives some interesting data, again from the 2001 Census, concerning length of stay in Greece. According to self declarations, by 2001 around 50% of male Albanians had been in Greece for over 5 years, and a slightly lower proportion of women. Of the other major migrant groups, only Filipinos had a higher proportion with long residence. These findings are confirmed by two other pieces of research in Athens in 2003. One, conducted by MRB Hellas, interviewed 491 immigrants over 18 with residence permits, and nationalities sampled roughly in line with the Census results. They reported that 50% of the sample have lived in Greece for 6-10 years, and another 15% for over 10 years (Athens News, 2003). The other research was conducted by ELIAMEP and funded by the EU; 501 structured interviews with Albanian immigrants (331 male, 178 female) were conducted in autumn 2003 in Athens. They found that 60% of the men had first arrived in Greece more than 8 years previously, and 90% more than 5 years; female Albanians had arrived slightly later, with only 53% resident for more than 8 years (Lyberaki and Maroukis, 2004: Appendix).

By 2000, no long-term residence permits had been issued in Greece (Groenendijk *et al.*, 2000). The duration of existing residence permits is not known, although it is clear that

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<sup>10</sup> Even in such cases, continued security of residence has not been assured. Notwithstanding the lack of information or proper research, a few cases have been presented to the author of immigrants who despite decades of continuous legal residence were refused renewal of their annual residence permits.

many immigrants with long residence (often illegal mixed with legal) are still on one or two-year permits. It is thought that a small number of long-term residence permits has now been issued, but is statistically insignificant. Immigration through family reunification rights is theoretically a possibility, although migrant groups claim that almost none have occurred and the state is obstructive: there are no data available on this. Finally, the extent of expulsions for illegal residence is the other side of the coin: again, the Ministry of Public Order refuses to supply the data in an official capacity, but these data have been handed out through various personal and political connections. **Chart A2** shows total numbers of “redirections” from police sweeps in Athens and elsewhere, with the majority of expulsions to Albania. These are significant numbers, and are not paralleled in any other European country, if only because international law and national law should protect immigrants from arbitrary acts of state officials.

**Thus, the first major step in integration – secure legal status – is still absent for the vast majority of immigrants, most of whom have resided in Greece for over 5 years. In particular, certain immigrant groups typically have residence of over a decade, yet seem to be left in a precarious situation. The only secure immigrant groups in Greece are EU nationals and ethnic Greeks: presumably the Polish and other East European immigrants have just been waiting for their coverage by the EU regime. For others, the new EU Directive on long-term residence is another hope for better management of immigrants’ rights in Greece.**

### ***(b) Labour market***

Despite the stringent requirements of the Greek state in demanding employment contracts, large amounts of social insurance contributions and other documentation from immigrants in Greece in order to get one-year work permits, there are no data available to indicate the nature of employment of immigrants. We are completely dependent upon the 2001 Census, registrations with one social insurance agency (IKA) and occasional pieces of independent research in order to have any information concerning the work of immigrants.

**Chart A3** shows Census self-declarations of male employment type for the principal nationalities. Unfortunately, the National Statistical Service has not released the data on secondary occupations, which is likely to be important for immigrants’ work. As can be seen from **Chart A3**, the major nationality of foreign workers is Albanian, and their most important

activity is construction work; Albanian male workers also have significant presence in the areas of agriculture, industry and tourism. **Chart A4** shows a percentage breakdown of principal male nationalities' employment, which reveals quite different profiles for each nationality. Ethnic specialisation is known from research to be reproduced as a stereotype, and this is very clear for some nationalities. Polish and Georgian workers are concentrated in construction, even more than are Albanians; Indians in agriculture [mainly flowergrowing]; Bulgarians also in agriculture, but of a different variety from Indians; Bangladeshi and Pakistanis in industry; Bangladeshi also have a presence in tourism.

Turning to female employment, **Chart A5** again shows the primacy of Albanians in the labour market, this time in an activity categorised as "Other".<sup>11</sup> We can presume this to be largely housekeeping. Looking in more detail at percentage breakdowns in **Chart A6**, for all immigrant groups this is the major activity: for Filipina, almost exclusively so. Romanian women show much less dependence on housekeeping, with a significant presence in tourism and agriculture; Russian, Bulgarian and Albanian women also show a little more diversity with presences in agriculture, industry and tourism.

Data on employment and unemployment rates in theory are available in all EU countries from the quarterly Labour Force Survey; in Greece, the sample-frame used until now has been the 1991 Census with almost no immigrants recorded. Thus, the results of the Survey are thought to be completely unreliable by the Statistical Service, despite the fact that OECD and the EC regularly publish and cite them. Furthermore, immigrant employment tends to be temporary and cyclical, in which case definitions of unemployment are fairly meaningless. Rather, we need measures of underemployment, which are not easily made.

There are no data on participation in the informal economy, which again is likely to be complex and mixed with formal employment. There is no research undertaken by the Greek state on the effects of two legalisations, nor any data on the outcome of the 2001 legalisation.

The research undertaken by MRB Hellas revealed an average employment rate of 80%, but this is not broken down by gender or nationality. It also revealed average employment types

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<sup>11</sup> Unhappily, the National Statistical Service did not consult immigration and labour market experts before constructing its Census questions, and did not identify the category of "domestic work" as the major activity of immigrant women. Thus, this category of "Other" theoretically includes housekeepers, university and schoolteachers, prostitutes etc.

as being 23% in construction, 20% as technicians, 13% as merchants, and 13% as domestic workers. The ELIAMEP project on Albanians in Athens is rather more useful in providing data. It shows for Albanian men, that 41% work in construction, 31% in industry, and 25% in business or self-employment. For women, domestic service constitutes 34%, with 35% either voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed. Employment is typically obtained through relatives and friends (77%) and immigrant associations seem insignificant in finding work. Household income data show a median income of just over €900 per month, with 60% of the sample earning in excess of €900 (Lyberaki and Maroukis, 2004).

Whilst these constitute the best data yet on immigrant employment, they reveal little about the extent of integration for the following reasons:

- The survey covers only Albanians
- There is no assessment of employment type relative to educational or skills background
- There is no comparison of immigrants' incomes by educational/skill level with Greek incomes
- There is no comparison of wages with Greek workers in comparable employment
- There is no standardised comparison of household income with Greek households

**Thus, these data do not permit any direct evaluation of immigrant integration in the labour market, other than to suggest that Albanians are doing better than they were ten years ago.**

#### Membership of social insurance schemes

The only data available on this are from IKA, the largest employees scheme, from 2002. Other large funds, such as OGA (agricultural) and TEBE (self-employed) do not provide any data at all on non-Greek membership. **Chart A7** shows nominal membership<sup>12</sup> of IKA by nationality for 2002. Immigrants constitute some 14% of IKA members, numbering 327,391 in 2002. About half are Albanians. Data are available only distinguishing between construction and non-construction work: **Chart A8** shows non-construction insurance, with Albanian males leading, followed by women of Albanian, Russian and Bulgarian nationalities. Most of the female employment is thought to be housekeeping, but this is not absolutely certain. For construction work, **Chart A9** shows that Albanians are the only significant nationality, constituting some 27% of insured construction workers and 75% of immigrant

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<sup>12</sup> Insurance for at least one day of the relevant year.

construction workers. In reality, owing to a large informal economy in this area, we can imagine that immigrants are a greater proportion of construction workers: there is some empirical evidence to support this. Finally, **Charts A10** and **A11** shows social insurance contribution levels. Immigrants are lagging behind Greeks slightly in the numbers with 50 contributions, and significantly lower with respect to larger amounts. This reflects immigrants' weaker positions in the labour market, in particular the lack of permanent full-time contracts or the refusal of employers to pay the social insurance *in toto*.

There is great significance attached to the levels of social insurance, as 300 stamps have been demanded routinely for renewal of work permits. As can be seen from **Chart A11**, even Greek construction workers do not possess 300 stamps: thus, the precarious labour market situation of immigrants is directly translated into a precarious legal situation.

### Self-employment

As previously noted, self-employment can constitute a route to integration for immigrant communities: in Greece, this could be seen as either a likely scenario (since Greeks have the greatest proportion of self-employment in the EU), or unlikely for the same reasons. For most of the early 1990s it was an option for very few migrants in Greece, owing to the extreme restrictions on all non-Greeks (including EU nationals) in carrying out most business or financial activities, combined with the lack of secure legal status of most immigrants. This situation changed with the 1998 legalization initiative, which informally apparently allowed holders of the "Green Card" to change their status to self-employed.<sup>13</sup> A newspaper report from 2001 revealed that during 2000 some 2.900 new businesses had been established by immigrants from over 90 countries, of which 35% were Albanian.<sup>14</sup> Prior to this, there had been only 5.900 foreign enterprises, with the majority in Athens.

More recent independent research suggests that, indeed, ethnic entrepreneurship has become a significant activity for immigrants in Greece. One category, that of street-hawkers, remains excluded as licences continue to be reserved for Greeks: there are apparently only 165 permits issued for Athens, with an estimate of 4.000 immigrant streetsellers (Athens News, 2003). The response of the municipal authorities in 2004 has been to use more aggressive policing to remove illegal street traders, especially after recent pressure from

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<sup>13</sup> This informal practice was recently enshrined in law.

<sup>14</sup> TAXIS, Ministry of Finance; source: *Imerisia*, 26/1/01. Attempts to acquire more recent data have been unsuccessful.



Greek shopkeepers about unfair competition. The Olympic Games are cited as a “reason” for removing all unauthorised traders: there are no plans to issue even a single extra permit.

As far as legitimate shops and other businesses are concerned, it is not possible to indicate their extent as no government agency monitors these developments (*Athens News*, 2003). The 2003 research of ELIAMEP found a large proportion of their sample of Albanians in self-employment (up to 24% for men, 19% for women), with businesses such as small shops, street kiosks, market stalls, small repair shops like cobblers, textile repairs, building cleaning services, take-aways and cafes, and even a paper factory. In their sample, one in three of the self-employed was ethnic Greek, a ratio well in excess of their presence.

A limited survey of a small area of central Athens in 2003 revealed a wide range of nationalities of ethnic businesses (Nigerian, Armenian/Lebanese, Kurdish, Sudanese, Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese) of which the majority were Chinese (Kolios 2004: 6). **Map 1** shows the distribution by nationality of shopkeepers. Furthermore, they supply a wide range of goods, the combination of which is not typical of the mainstream Greek economy. **Map 2** shows the principal services of each business (ranging from mobile phones, through money transfer, to fresh meat), although typically they are providing more complex services than can be easily summarised.

According to Kolios, the majority of businesses he interviewed (20, with 15 owners) were set up after the legalisation of 1998. Those predating this relied upon business co-operation with Greeks, bilateral migration agreements, student visas, and also probably gaps in their legal coverage. Capital funding was most importantly from savings from employment in Greece, followed by property sales in the country of origin. Capital loans from friends, relatives or ethnic associations in Greece were more or less irrelevant (Kolios 2004: 10). The actual business activities with the mainstream economy were found to be extensive, with some limited international links with co-ethnics in other EU cities. There was little or no evidence of ethnic economies developing, either in terms of links with other immigrant entrepreneurs or in terms of an exclusive clientele. Shopkeepers were reluctant to quantify the proportions of Greeks and other nationalities using their services, with only two responses to the question (Kolios 2004: 13). However, it is quite possible that the political sensitivity of Greeks in such issues is not lost on immigrants in Greece: we are therefore unable to reach any secure conclusions concerning the functioning of such businesses.

### ***(c) Housing and urban issues***

The participation and effect of immigration on the housing market in Greece is almost completely unresearched and largely open to speculation. There are data in the 2001 Census, of which only some have recently been released, but without enough detail to make strong conclusions. **Table A3** shows broad categories of the housing situation across Greece for total Greece, EU nationals, and non-EU nationals. Greeks have one of the highest rates of home ownership in Europe, approaching 80%. In **Table A3**, the total for Greece does not indicate Greek home ownership rates, but for all residents of Greece – this is 71% owner-occupied, and 18% tenants. The picture for non-EU immigrants is almost a mirror image – 16% with own homes, and 68% in rented accommodation. Also, from these data we can see that immigrants in Greece (EU + non-EU) constitute some 25% of all rented housing.

**Table A4** gives private household size, by total Greece, EU nationals, and non-EU. For both the total data and EU nationals, there are small proportions of households with more than 5 persons (9% and 5% respectively). For non-EU immigrants, the figure is 15%, along with a higher figure for 5-person households. More detailed data on ages of household members (not given here) show that the majority of the very large households are dominated by persons aged 20-40, and for 5 person households, a wider range of 10-50. It is not clear from available data whether the large households are actually families with young parents and children, or if there are many non-familial households included in this category. However, it seems more likely to be the relative poverty of younger families which is the cause of overcrowding and large households.

Insofar as discrimination in the housing market is concerned, there is simply no reliable information. Hatziprokopiou (2003) reports from an interview sample in Thessaloniki that refusal to rent to Albanians was a serious problem for them. In Athens, various newspaper reports and others (*Athens News*, 21/3/03; Baldwin-Edwards (2004c)) comment on the continuing public advertisements and notices in Athens refusing to rent property to foreigners. There are also allegations that immigrants since 2003 have been asked to pay higher rents: again, it is impossible to verify this as a general phenomenon.

Access to state-subsidized housing is theoretically available to legal migrants, but in practice few have been beneficiaries because of immigrants' poor social insurance coverage prior to 1998. The eligibility requirements of OEK are onerous even for Greeks (e.g. 10 years of social insurance stamps for a single person to be eligible): for immigrants, they constitute

indirect and structural discrimination, although Albanians with large families might find the regulations beneficial. These requirements are shown in the table below:

worker with 2 children	1500 working days
worker with 3 children	1000 working days
worker with 4 children	750 working days
worker with 5-9 children	400 working days
worker with 4-9 children and one disabled family member	300 working days
worker with more than 10 children	100 working days
political refugees (Greeks) or blind	750 working days
seriously disabled and paraplegic	300 working days
new couples	1200 working days
earthquake victims	900 working days
single persons	3000 working days

Source OEK

Housing in Athens

Within the city of Athens itself, there is some research undertaken by DEPOS<sup>15</sup> in 1999. The results are shown in **Table A5**. The research took in its sample some 14% “low income” Greeks, 5% non-Albanian immigrants, and 3% Albanian immigrants, with the remainder of the sample representing higher income groups of the Athenian Greek population. In several respects, there is great similarity between the housing conditions of poor Greeks and those of immigrants: similarities include the age of buildings (30% built before 1960), lack of basic amenities (11%), rooms per person (0,7) etc. All of these form a marked contrast with the living conditions of the general population of Greece. However, in a few specific respects, the immigrant population fared even worse than poor Greeks: these were in the areas of % cohabiting, % with less than 25m<sup>2</sup> per person, and other indicators of insufficient living space.

The more recent survey by ELIAMEP of Albanians in Athens provides some additional data (Lyberaki and Maroukis, 2004). They find overcrowding to be a “minor issue”, particularly for large households of 5-7 members which were 30% of their sample. (There is a strong caveat that respondents were reluctant to admit to housing problems, so we might wonder if a “minor issue” is really a serious one.) 78% of Albanians lived with their families, which suggests a massive family reunification phenomenon over the last few years. About 50% of rents were €200-300, with 37% below €200: these are very low rents, even for medium

<sup>15</sup> Public Corporation for Housing and Urban Development

sized properties in cheaper parts of Athens. 37% of their respondents were living in the city centre, and only 24% of the sample had lived for more than 6 years in one residence. Home ownership is reported as low, although no figure is stated.

### Urban issues

The immigrant population of Athens is not exactly replicative of the immigrant population of Greece *in toto*. **Table A6** gives some foreign population data from the Census 2001 on immigrants in Athens and the largest nearby region, East Attika. Other than the expected Albanian mass of 52% of immigrants, the Polish are surprisingly evident at 3,3% of immigrant population, in excess of Bulgarians, Romanians and Ukrainians. Pakistanis, Iraqi, Turks and Filipinos are also strongly present in Athens. In East Attika, Pakistanis and Indians are surprisingly large in proportion, and Albanians constitute a large proportion of 63% of immigrant groups, despite the presence of large numbers of British, Americans and Cypriots.

It is, nevertheless, Albanians who constitute the major immigrant group in Athens, at 145.000 persons – over 5% of the total Athens population. As we have already noted, immigrants take up some 25% of the rented housing market: it would be expected for this to have a major impact on a city such as Athens. Across southern Europe, Malheiros notes the increasing ethnic segregation of populations in Mediterranean cities. Traditionally, the Mediterranean city had almost no socio-geographic divisions, owing to the nature of property construction, urban development and the form of capitalism itself (Leontidou, 1985). Recently, Malheiros finds that urban development and immigration phenomena in southern Europe have interacted, such that “areas where immigrants cluster are also areas with relatively high levels of social and housing deprivation. As a result, ethnic residential segregation is in part an expression of social exclusion” (Malheiros, 2002: 107).

Given the complete lack of research on this in Athens, we can only speculate on the basis of anecdotal and impressionistic evidence: however, it seems that immigrants in Athens have formed a complement to the mass exodus of Greeks to the healthier, cooler and more affluent suburbs. It is likely that immigrant participation in the housing market has pushed rental prices higher [since 1997 they have annually been in excess of 20% per annum] and has probably reduced pressure on landlords to modernise and improve the quality of cheaper housing. The socio-spatial concentrations of migrants in certain poorer areas of Athens should be of concern to the municipality: although at this point there is no obvious problem, and no existing ghetto situations, this could easily change. Large concentrations of socio-

economically disadvantaged residents are dangerous regardless of ethnicity; the ethnic dimension simply adds to the potential problems.

## **STAGE 2 INDICATORS: family grouping and settlement**

### ***(d) Education and language skills***

The educational profiles of immigrant groups have not been adequately studied, and should be very relevant in examining labour market integration and social integration issues, such as continuing education. Tables A7 and A8 show elaborations of data taken from the 2001 Census. There are many problems with these data, so caution is urged: first, they are self-declared information; secondly, there is poor comparability across countries, with respect to examinations and diplomas; thirdly, there may have been some misinterpretation of the question by census-takers.<sup>16</sup>

Looking at the profiles of the major immigrant groups, it seems that the lowest educational levels are shown by Albanians, along with various Asian nationalities (other than Filipino). The highest educational levels are shown by nationals from the EU, Cyprus, USA and most of the former Soviet bloc. Chart A12 shows in diagrammatic form the relative shares in educational level of different immigrant groups: simply through sheer force of numbers, Albanians constitute the greatest part of immigrants with less than compulsory schooling [points 7-10]. However, even for degree level and secondary qualifications [points 2-5], Albanians constitute 30-50% of the immigrant share. It is only with postgraduate education that EU nationals, US citizens and Cypriots dominate.

### School education

The number of immigrant children in Greek state schools has increased at a phenomenal rate since the early 1990s, although even basic data seem to be in dispute. This arises largely from the determination of the Ministry of Education, and those researchers privileged with its unpublished data, to perpetuate an almost propagandistic statistical data presentation which makes complex and unreal distinctions between aliens without Greek ethnicity [*allogeneis*] and aliens with Greek ethnicity [*homogeneis*]. In the case of Albanians, this distinction is particularly irrelevant and unhelpful; nor is it useful with Russian or Pontian

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<sup>16</sup> There are very high numbers of "illiterates" from advanced countries, suggesting that this question was interpreted as a proxy for competence in the Greek language.

Greeks, as almost none of the children arrived with any command of the Greek language, or knowledge of the Greek school curriculum.

**Table A9** gives one version of numbers of immigrant children in the state school system; as far as we know, there are no official sources of published data on this. According to these data, immigrant children in state secondary schools have increased from 14.000 [of which nearly 10.000 were ethnic Greeks] in 1995/6, to 52.000 [of which, 18.000 were ethnic Greeks] in 2002/3, the latter representing some 7,5% of secondary school population. The major increases have been of Albanian children, who numbered some 63.000 (including *homogeneis*) in primary and secondary education in 2002/3.

There are reportedly some data collected by ΙΠΟΔΕ<sup>17</sup> on school success rates of immigrant children, but we have been unable to locate these data. Clearly, such information – adjusted for socio-economic class – would be a clear indicator in comparison with Greek children of the extent of immigrant integration into the school system. Various success stories of foreign (mainly Albanian) children coming top of their entire school and being entitled to carry the Greek flag in an annual procession, have come to public attention: this has been through the recent opposition of many Greek children and their parents to Albanians carrying the Greek flag.<sup>18</sup> However, the general picture suggested even by Ministry of Education personnel is that the drop-out rates are very high because of (a) pressure from their families to work and increase household income; (b) limited language skills which make foreign students fearful of high school; and (c) school failure as early as middle school, without graduation from the *gymnasium* (Anthopoulou, 2004: 221).

### Higher and Further Education

Higher education is relevant in two regards: recognition of foreign degrees and diplomas by DIKATSA<sup>19</sup>; and access to Greek colleges and universities for further study. Given the general and very serious problems of the operation of DIKATSA, even for Greeks, it is not surprising that no data can be obtained on foreigners' applications. It seems highly unlikely that very many immigrants with degrees from former Soviet or Balkan countries, for example, will have been able to get their qualifications accepted in Greece. As can be seen

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<sup>17</sup> Centre for Education Research

<sup>18</sup> For a detailed official report on these incidents, see Baldwin-Edwards (2003). The number of cases reported of schools where foreign children came top of the school, was 6 in 2003.

<sup>19</sup> Full title of DIKATSA??

from **Table A7**, there are some 3.000 non-EU immigrants with postgraduate degrees, and 60.000 with undergraduate degrees.

Access to higher education is available for legally resident immigrants, but a quota is set for maximum admissions. No data on admissions or success rates are collected or published, to our knowledge.

Continuing education, a new idea for Greece, was found to be quite popular with Albanians in Athens in the ELIAMEP survey: 6,7% had attended courses over the previous year, compared with 1% of Greeks. The 18-24 age cohort was the most likely to have attended a course (Lyberaki and Maroukis, 2004: 17). No other information has been found on this issue.

#### Language skills

There is limited para-state provision for language teaching of adult immigrants,<sup>20</sup> as well as some special programmes reserved for ethnic Greeks from Pontos. Within the school system there are 26 special so-called Intercultural Schools which give intensive language preparation for children to assist them to be integrated into the normal school system (Anthopoulou, 2004: 222). Greece opposes Immigrant Minority Language Instruction, with the result that many immigrant children now have poor command of the language of their country of nationality. This has implications for their future employment, and probably will keep them in Greece as permanent residents.

The two surveys conducted in Athens in 2003, have data on language acquisition. MRB found that 70% of children are fluent in Greek, and 28% of adults resident in Greece for more than 6 years were still trying to learn Greek. The ELIAMEP survey of Albanians found that "the majority" of adults spoke Greek well, although fewer were able to write. In examining patterns of learning Greek, the most common method was found to be in the context of work (69%), followed by television (50%). The proportion through formal courses was very low at 18% (Lyberaki and Maroukis, 2004: 17).

#### ***(e) Health and social services***

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<sup>20</sup> Schemes are implemented through organizations such as ERGONOKEK and the Social Work Foundation (Leventis, 2004).

Data on immigrant participation in health and other social services are apparently non-existent, other than the recently achieved data by IKA. All immigrants are theoretically entitled to free emergency medical treatment in state hospitals, although the administration is supposed to report them to the police. Normal usage of state health services requires social insurance coverage, such as IKA, TEBE, OGA etc. (see previous section on labour market): these social insurance funds should be able to report on usage of health services, and do not do so. According to the ELIAMEP survey in Athens, Albanians have encountered few problems in using state hospitals, whilst some use private doctors. No other information is currently available.

NGOS<sup>21</sup> such as *Médecins sans Frontières* and Doctors of the World provide free medical care to immigrants and others in need. Such provision, although vital to the quality of life of many people, is not large in quantity and the data not very relevant for issues of immigrant integration.

#### ***(f) Social and cultural integration***

There are no objective indicators possible in this area. It is helpful to identify a few areas, where social and cultural integration might be identifiable. First, the media. Greek television does not exclude immigrants, nor does it make many efforts to include them. Increasingly, Albanians appear on tv shows and there is some indication of the beginnings of social integration; on the other hand, there are no tv programmes specifically for or about immigrant communities. One small tv station, *Kanali 10*, has regular news in Albanian and Russian. Radio coverage is slightly more extensive, with the Athens Municipality station *Radio 984* targeted at the immigrant community; *Radio Skai*, which has an Albanian programme once a week; *Radio Filia*, which is part of the state ERA broadcasting service, has foreign language broadcasts.

Greek language newspapers seem to follow a similar pattern to tv, with neither exclusion nor inclusion. Two English language newspapers [*Athens News* and *Kathimerini English Edition*] are more targeted at the English-speaking foreign communities, although Greeks also read these. There is a large selection of foreign press for a wide range of languages and nationalities, mostly published in Athens: these seem to be highly volatile, temporary publications which do not serve a functional market.

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<sup>21</sup> Mostly, those participating in the EQUAL consortium of *Migrants in Greece*, Lambrakis Foundation.



Cultural events do occur, with participation of immigrant communities and Greeks: these are frequently anti-racist festivals, which presumably attract politically motivated Greek participants rather than ordinary citizens. Some migrant associations have, over the last year or so, made serious attempts to involve other immigrant communities and Greeks in cultural events, such as art exhibitions and music concerts.

The behaviour of state authorities is of some interest. After intense criticism from leading academic researchers, several state agencies dealing with immigrants on a regular basis have started to become more sensitised to issues relating to immigrants' rights and social integration. These agencies include various arms of the Ministry of Labour (OAED, IKA) and also the Greek Police: clear instructions have been given in a recent 6-page circular from the Ministry of Public Order to strengthen immigrants' rights and prohibit police violence (*Athens News*, 26/9/03).

Insofar as public opinion is concerned, Greece has a long history of high levels of xenophobic intolerance recorded in opinion polls, although rather less visible in reality. A 2002 poll was conducted by EKKE and University of Thessaly amongst 2.100 households in Attika. In total, 44% of respondents believed that immigrants and gypsies should live, separately from Greeks, in other areas; in the poor neighbourhoods of Menidi and Aspropyrgos where large numbers of minorities live, 71% of Greeks said they would prefer Albanians and gypsies moved elsewhere. Overall, high levels of racial intolerance were clearly linked with low educational levels and low incomes of Greeks (*Athens News*, 7/3/03).

The statistical data on crime and court outcomes are still so poor, that little progress has been made since earlier research (see e.g. Baldwin-Edwards, 2001; Karydis, 1995). In particular, there has been no attempt to follow through statistically the ratios of court convictions to prosecutions to arrests, by national group and other socio-economic criteria. Furthermore, the data from the Ministry of Justice on court outcomes are so badly lagged (a delay of about 7 years) that they are almost useless. It is not therefore possible to give data on crime rates by nationality, and the available data from the Greek police ["Persons Known to the Police"] are not reliable data. What can be said, is that some 44% of prisoners in Greece are not of Greek citizenship (Kourakis 2003); again, though, this is little change from

2000 and there is still no serious research undertaken to explain why this situation has occurred.

Finally, we have no data on mixed marriages, which are known to occur even with the recent Albanian immigrants. Although such data are traditionally taken as an powerful indicator of integration, there is now great doubt that this still pertains. However, it would still be useful to have some knowledge of this phenomenon in Greece.

### **STAGE 3 INDICATORS: formation of ethnic communities and/or assimilation**

#### ***(g) Nationality, civic citizenship and respect for diversity***

Although it is clearly premature to examine this stage of immigrant integration in Greece, with almost negligible numbers of second generation migrants (or even 1,5 generation), there is some reason for so doing. The existing structures are unlikely to be changed significantly before the children of current immigrant populations reach the age of majority: it is precisely these institutional frameworks which impede or facilitate immigrant integration. Specific targeted measures are much less important.

#### Attribution of Greek citizenship

As discussed in Section 1(b) above, Greek nationality is attributable through the bloodline. Ethnic Greeks from Pontos who can provide documentation are given fast-track citizenship procedures, for which there are no data available. It is thought to be in excess of 150.000 persons over the last five years. Other ethnic Greeks [*homogeneis*] must apply through the normal naturalisation procedures, although without paying the fee. Non-Greeks [*allogeneis*] also apply through this procedure but are required to have been resident in Greece for at least 10 years, to have a high standard of written and spoken Greek, various other unknown criteria, and to pay an application fee of €1.500 – the highest in Europe. Table A10 shows total approvals of naturalization applications 1980-2003 for both *allogeneis* and *homogeneis*. The figures are very low, showing clearly that Greece has the most exclusive approach to the discretionary granting of citizenship across the EU. *There are no data on applications refused; there are no data provided, although they exist, on citizenship by former nationality. Furthermore, Greece usually requires the relinquishment of any previous nationalities.*

Foreigners born on Greek territory are not granted citizenship, even in the absence of acquiring a parental nationality: they must wait for the age of majority to apply for naturalization, although this requires 10 years of continuous residence.

#### Political participation

Immigrants residing legally in Greece do not have the right to vote or to stand for elections at either the local or national level: about half of the EU countries grant local voting rights, either universally or by bilateral agreement. Uniquely in the EU, there is no formal body representing immigrants with which the Greek state consults on matters concerning immigrants (IOM: 44): at this time, there are no plans to facilitate such.

#### Religious freedoms and practices

Religious activities are strictly controlled by the Ministry of Education and Religion. The traditional hostility of Greece to all religions other than Orthodoxy<sup>22</sup> and Judaism has given way recently to greater tolerance, especially since the removal of religious affiliation from national identity cards. Although there has been some progress in the granting of licences for places of worship (ECRI, 2004: 21), outside of Thraki there are still no authorised mosques, despite large and growing Muslim communities. Plans were made for a mosque to be built [with foreign money] near to Athens Airport and the 2004 Olympic residences, in order to avoid the embarrassment of being unable to provide places of worship for competitors. This would be of little use to permanent Muslim residents of Attika, as the distance to travel to it is very great. There are no plans to permit any other mosques to be built in Greece, let alone in Athens itself, although there is an old mosque in central Plaka which had been in use at the time of Greek independence. A recent ECRI<sup>23</sup> Report (ECRI, 2004: 21-22) notes not only the absence of authorised mosques, but also that Muslim cremation and burial practices are not permitted outside of Thraki.

There are two private schools for immigrant children in Greece, both in Athens: an Arabic school in Pyschiko and a Polish Catholic school in central Athens.

#### Respect for diversity

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<sup>22</sup> The exception is in the province of Thraki, where under arrangements laid down in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1922, there are special arrangements for the Turkish-speaking Minority to worship according to the Muslim religion.

<sup>23</sup> European Commission on Racism and Intolerance, Council of Europe.

Although it is premature to judge, there seems to be remarkably little tolerance of diversity at the level of the state's formal institutions. Within civil society, opinion polls are not positive on this point either: Greece, in its relatively recent formation of a modern nation-state, has remained locked into a monocultural framework. Thus, the assumption underlying immigrant integration seems to be that they should try to assimilate, to become Greeks insofar as possible. One immigrant community, the Albanian, has accommodated itself more readily to this expectation – perhaps through a shared Balkan mentality, of accepting and “humouring” the holders of power. Thus, very many Albanians change their names to Greek forms, baptise their Muslim children as Orthodox Greeks, and generally “fit in” with what Greeks expect (Hatzipokopiou, 2003; Lyberaki and Maroukis, 2004). This strategy has improved relations between Greeks and Albanians, but could not be described as ‘respect for diversity’. With regard to other immigrant groups there is a deficit of information: possibly, with cultures less close to recent Greek history, there is a chance of future acceptance of the right to be different.

## 6) CONCLUSIONS

What can we deduce from the available data, using our analytic framework, about the integration of immigrant communities in Greece? First of all, let me express two major caveats, whose importance cannot be overemphasised:

- The quality and extent of data are generally too poor for us to know securely what exactly has been happening with each immigrant group
- For almost all immigrant groups, we are dealing with first-generation migrants and should not expect high levels of integration

However, it is reasonable to look at indicators in what have been postulated as the first two stages of migrant incorporation – **residence and employment**, and **family grouping and settlement**. Turning to the first stage: *Legal integration*, according to all available evidence looks very poor for most migrant groups, with the clear exceptions of EU nationals and ethnic Greeks – ‘privileged aliens’ governed by different immigration laws. *Labour market integration* is covered by poor quality data, with no possible comparisons drawable with Greeks’ employment and income situation. There is limited evidence to suggest that immigrant communities are more integrated into the formal labour market than they were a decade ago, that there is better coverage of social insurance, and perhaps less exploitation by employers. It also seems that a changed political opportunity structure has more readily permitted self-employment, although the nature, extent and causal patterns of this look amorphous. *Housing and urban issues* are more clearly indicative of a general issue of social and economic marginalization, with immigrants occupying the very poorest sectors of Athens and with the worst housing conditions. Furthermore, the figure calculated here showing that 25% of Greece’s flat rentals are to non-Greeks is a significant revelation, especially as that ratio is probably higher within Athens itself.

Looking at the indicators for the second stage, *Education and language skills* unsurprisingly present an array of problems. Most European countries have had mixed results in their management of these (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003), principally through the operation of pre-existing institutional frameworks. In Greece, there are clear expressions of ‘structural exclusion’ exhibited by institutions such as DIKATSA, the lack of state provision for Greek language acquisition by recent migrants, the general school system’s *modus operandi*, and its refusal to provide IMLI or make other accommodations for immigrant children. In the area of *Health and social services*, there are no data and it is not possible to say anything at

all. With *Social and cultural integration*, the limited evidence suggests the beginnings of integration of some ethnic communities into the Greek mainstream. The media has made great progress in accepting immigrants, in comparison with the early to mid-1990s: it has not, on the other hand, strongly sought the inclusion of immigrant communities. The general population, especially low-paid and uneducated Greeks, appears fairly intolerant of not only immigrants but also Greek minorities such as Roma. It even seems that Greeks would favour the emergence of ethnic ghettos, presumably with little comprehension about their longer term implications. Data on crime remain so unreliable that it seems pointless, even dangerous, to cite them: there is limited evidence to suggest that immigrants are strongly linked with certain sorts of crime [beggary, theft, robbery, petty drug-dealing]. This is a worldwide pattern, and therefore unremarkable.

The third stage of integration – **formation of ethnic communities and/or assimilation** – has highly problematic conclusions to be drawn. At this point, the negative evaluation is partly because it is not possible to derive indicators pertaining to the future behaviour of the general population. Thus, our indicators are all structural indicators – how the Greek state behaves. The award of Greek citizenship is exclusionary, and seen as a “reward” for good behaviour or assimilation as a Greek, rather than as a normal mechanism to promote the integration of resident foreigners. The positive discrimination in favour of ethnic Greeks has a clear implication of exclusion of non-Greek aliens: this can only be seen in a negative light by immigrant communities. Political participation is completely denied, even at a consultative level; religious freedom is tolerated, at best. Overall, one is forced to conclude that existing Greek state institutional frameworks have little respect for diversity.

#### Integration trajectories of the principal immigrant groups

Much of this has to be conjectural, and the longer term could well change or even reverse patterns of apparent integration. However, at this point the following seem to apply:

**Albanians:** seem to favour an assimilationist strategy, with flexibility about religion, adoption of Greek names, baptism of their children as Orthodox. Albanian history suggests that the culture is accommodatory, adapting to different power regimes whilst trying to retain identity. Therefore, there is a doubt about whether they really will assimilate and turn into Greeks. There is also great doubt about whether they could show classical assimilation,

or be confined to underclass formation. It is possible, owing to the sheer numbers and non-cohesiveness of the Albanian community in Greece, that they could exhibit both patterns.

**Other Balkan and East European:** Bulgarians, Romanians, Ukrainians and others seem to consider themselves Guestworkers, but many are showing signs of longer-term plans to remain. They do not appear to want to accommodate Greek demands in the way that Albanians have tolerated, so their integration strategy looks unclear.

**Poles:** seem to have established an ethnic community, although not as isolated as the US experiences would imply. There is substantial interaction with the Greek economy and society, but considerable self-support within the Polish community.

**Asians:** there seem to be two main categories. Guestworkers [male Pakistani, Indians and Bangladeshi] who have no thoughts on integrating, and are seemingly confined by their limited Greek and low educational levels to low-pay factory or agricultural work. Many of these see Greece as a transit country, as a route to the UK in particular. The other category consists of ethnic entrepreneurs, whose businesses seem to serve mainly (several) ethnic communities, but are also linked into the mainstream Greek economy and society.

**Egyptians:** may be an example of classical assimilation, as they have been in Greece for several decades. Little is really known about this community.

### National Policy Objectives

Returning to Vermeulen's integration policy choices above [Section 3(d)], how does Greek policy appear according to the three dimensions? The first dimension, **equality of opportunity**, demands equal access to education, housing, employment and the political system. Greece grants this in theory in the first three areas, and excludes it in the last: in the case of employment, effectively legislation has created the segmented labour market and equal opportunity is mere rhetoric. Access to education is perhaps less obviously unequal, but there is no clear policy objective of promoting equal access.

The second dimension, **homogeneity versus heterogeneity**, places Greece clearly toward the extreme of non-tolerance of cultural and ethnic difference, as contrasted with pluralist

toleration or multiculturalism. The implication here is that only assimilation of immigrants is a valid policy goal.

The third dimension, **inclusion versus exclusion**, again locates Greece towards the pole of exclusion rather than inclusion, since mere toleration of difference is not sufficient to be inclusive. In particular, Greek mainstream acceptance of diverse cultural values and religions looks very unlikely at this juncture.

#### Athens, in comparative perspective

The immigration problems facing Athens are not unique, and show clear parallels not only with other contemporary cities, but also historically. Koff, as noted earlier [Section 3(c)], has examined in great detail the local policy environments of four cities in Italy and France. It seems that Bari has a structure which most closely resembles Athens, with little politicisation of immigration (unlike Florence) and a strong issue of problems of economic integration for both natives and immigrants. Both Lille and Toulouse suffer from ethnic ghettos, which the Italian cities have managed to avoid. Koff notes that Bari and Toulouse are the most tolerant of immigrants, but that they score low on integration measures: thus, toleration does not equal integration.

Alexander has posited a characterisation of local host-stranger relations, with a specific type of non-policy he calls 'Transient'. This usually pertains in an early phase of immigration, and corresponds closely with Koff's description of 'toleration' found in Bari. This reactive and *ad hoc* policy is also commonly found with most policy areas in the Greek state, so it is no surprise to find it in the Municipality of Athens. However, there is a limited life-span for this non-policy: soon, Athens will need to decide *how* it would like immigrants to integrate, *what policies* would further those objectives, and how to *measure and evaluate* changes. This presents a real challenge for local politicians, as well as for those at the national level.

#### The Data Deficit

As should be clear from the material in Section 5 above, there are serious problems with lack of data in almost all areas. The problem is so endemic, it is not even possible to select a few key areas to target. *Some key indicators are suggested in detail, in Section 4 above.* For these reasons, the case for an **Immigrant Integration Observatory** is overwhelming,



even if one of its main functions is to pressure state agencies and others to collect and collate their statistical data in an appropriate way. Several guiding principles can be stated here:

- 1) data must cover all major immigrant groups separately, instead of taking immigrants to be an homogeneous group.
- 2) data must be collected for clear, explicitly-stated purposes of monitoring and policy analysis , rather than merely for day-to-day bureaucratic management. The latter type of data are frequently of little use for researchers and policy-makers.
- 3) data should record such variables as sex, socio-economic class, educational background, age, work experience etc. in order that clear comparisons can be made with the Greek population.
- 4) data prepared by public authorities should, subject to the Data Protection Act, be seen as public property, not a political good to be traded for profit. Regular publication of statistics on the internet should be a norm, rather than exception.

However, we have to recognise that the complex phenomenon of immigrant integration cannot be analysed simply through collection of statistical data. Serious, focused research initiatives are essential to provide in-depth knowledge about each of the immigrant groups, their role in the Greek society and economy, and their own personal experiences and perceptions of life in Greece. This will prove particularly important for second and third generation immigrants – the real target group of an integration policy. The funding of research requires strong political will, and a realisation that information is one of the most vital, and ephemeral, commodities of the twenty first century.

Thus, the continuous monitoring of data through an Observatory, the development of focused research projects along with enhanced practical measures to promote immigrant integration are all essential tools. The EQUAL programme has made a significant contribution in helping Greece adjust to recent mass immigration: for the future, it is vital that the programme's successes are consolidated and their momentum maintained.

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TABLE A1	Data on immigrants in Greece, from Census 2001, Legalization applications 1998, and valid Residence Permits, 2004										permits/ legalizn.	permits/ Census
	CENSUS 2001			APPLICATIONS FOR LEGALIZATION, 1998			VALID RESIDENCE PERMITS, 15/1/04					
	M + F	M	F	M+F	M	F	M+F	M	F			
TOTAL	797,091	436,407	360,684	369,968	267,982	93,433	228,354	156,731	71,623	61.7	28.6	
Albania	443,550	261,502	182,048	241,561	195,262	41,025	143,124	112,435	30,689	59.2	32.3	
Bulgaria	37,230	15,058	22,172	25,168	10,494	14,108	20,745	7,968	12,777	82.4	55.7	
Georgia	23,159	9,980	13,179	7,548	2,741	4,655	5,574	2,038	3,536	73.8	24.1	
Rumania	23,066	13,176	9,890	16,954	11,444	5,137	10,110	6,244	3,866	59.6	43.8	
USA	22,507	11,013	11,494	83	40	42	584	298	286			
Cyprus	19,084	9,031	10,053									
Russian Federation	18,219	6,901	11,318	3,139	757	2,301	3,194	583	2,611	101.8	17.5	
UK	15,308	6,450	8,858	6	5	1	7	6	1			
Germany	15,303	6,525	8,778									
Ukraine	14,149	3,633	10,516	9,821	1,882	7,721	8,049	1,508	6,541	82.0	56.9	
Poland	13,378	6,140	7,238	8,631	4,764	3,718	1,876	819	1,057	21.7	14.0	
Pakistan	11,192	10,703	489	10,933	10,432	51	6,933	6,862	71	63.4	61.9	
Australia	9,677	4,580	5,097	27	11	17	109	50	59			
Turkey	8,297	4,338	3,959	149	126	19	295	173	122	198.0	3.6	
Italy	7,953	3,962	3,991									
Egypt	7,846	6,087	1,759	6,231	5,704	347	3,460	3,214	246	55.5	44.1	
Armenia	7,808	3,648	4,160	2,734	1,354	1,304	1,953	919	1,034	71.4	25.0	
India	7,409	6,876	533	6,405	6,068	103	4,237	4,032	205	66.2	57.2	
Iraq	7,188	5,062	2,126	2,833	2,365	416	242	211	31	8.5	3.4	
Canada	6,909	3,337	3,572	36	10	25	124	64	60			
Philippines	6,861	1,942	4,919	5,383	904	4,361	1,822	326	1,496	33.8	26.6	
France	6,513	2,733	3,780	2	2	0						
Rep. of Moldova	5,898	1,799	4,099	4,396	1,138	3,160	4,052	1,136	2,916	92.2	68.7	
Syria	5,638	4,464	1,174	3,434	3,148	158	1,910	1,738	172	55.6	33.9	
Bangladesh	4,927	4,758	169	3,024	2,890	25	1,966	1,944	22	65.0	39.9	
Yugoslavia	4,051	1,947	2,104	2,335	1,282	1,007	1,649	797	852	70.6	40.7	
Netherlands	2,931	1,079	1,852	2	1	1						
Sweden	2,437	964	1,473	3	1	2						
Kazakhstan	2,269	957	1,312	297	66	224	252	64	188	84.8	11.1	
Nigeria	2,021	1,434	587	1,746	1,357	350	507	387	120	29.0	25.1	
Austria	1,776	734	1,042									
Belgium	1,703	737	966									
Switzerland	1,462	575	887	26	12	12	6	1	5			
Spain	1,308	598	710									
Lebanon	1,291	825	466	246	192	45	398	304	94	161.8	30.8	
South Africa	1,185	559	626	37	7	28	65	18	47	175.7	5.5	
Ethiopia	1,171	369	802	931	261	636	207	85	122	22.2	17.7	
Japan	1,086	421	665	17	9	8	82	43	39	482.4	7.6	
Iran	1,064	784	280	137	113	24	97	77	20	70.8	9.1	
Denmark	1,055	402	653									
FYR of Macedonia	962	614	348	436	343	76	340	238	102	78.0	35.3	
Sri Lanka	864	329	535	820	283	515	300	107	193	36.6	34.7	
Brazil	859	281	578	94	18	75	156	76	80	166.0	18.2	
Finland	828	190	638									
Uzbekistan	825	315	510	156	29	121	253	49	204	162.2	30.7	
Czech Republic	818	333	485	107	28	75	150	42	108	140.2	18.3	
Jordan	681	487	194	146	132	9	254	200	54	174.0	37.3	
China	648	395	253	326	218	100	919	601	318	281.9	141.8	
Other nationalities	14,727	7,380	7,347	3,608	2,089	1,431	2,353	1,074	1,279	65.2	16.0	

**Table A2****Age distribution of immigrants in Greece, 2001 (000s)**

	<b>M</b>	<b>F</b>	<b>M+F</b>
0-4	19,970	18,464	38,434
5-9	22,317	20,497	42,814
10-14	24,297	21,545	45,842
			<b>127,090</b>
15-19	34,124	25,511	59,635
20-24	56,219	37,292	93,511
25-29	63,206	44,237	107,443
30-34	55,298	42,298	97,596
35-39	41,851	35,842	77,693
40-44	33,303	31,227	64,530
45-49	22,301	23,148	45,449
50-54	14,970	16,068	31,038
55-59	8,586	8,879	17,465
60-64	6,806	7,250	14,056
	<b>336,664</b>	<b>271,752</b>	<b>608,416</b>
65-69	4,950	5,019	9,969
70-74	3,502	4,167	7,669
75-79	1,981	2,630	4,611
80-84	1,075	1,440	2,515
85-89	574	751	1,325
90-94	131	273	404
95-99	33	63	96
>=100	58	38	96
			<b>26,685</b>
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>415,552</b>	<b>346,639</b>	<b>762,191</b>

Source: Census, 2001





TABLE A4

**Population in private households by household size and citizenship indicator**

	<b>Both sexes all</b>		<b>non-nationals other EU</b>		<b>non-nationals non-EU</b>	
Total	10,266,004	%	40,116	%	631,357	%
1 person	723,660	7	4,245	11	28,444	5
2 persons	2,057,730	20	10,901	27	87,203	14
3 persons	2,315,553	23	9,170	23	136,575	22
4 persons	3,010,704	29	10,201	25	183,726	29
5 persons	1,237,730	12	3,660	9	101,015	16
6 persons	555,234	5	1,233	3	50,055	8
7 persons or more	365,393	4	706	2	44,339	7

SOURCE: Census 2001

**TABLE A5**

Στεγαστικές συνθήκες 'φτωχών' νοικοκυριών, Αθήνα 1999

	‘ΦΤΩΧΑ’ ΝΟΙΚΟΚΥΡΙΑ	ΑΛΛΟΔΑΠΑ ΝΟΙΚΟΚΥΡΙΑ	ΑΛΒΑΝΙΚΑ ΝΟΙΚΟΚΥΡΙΑ	ΣΥΝΟΛΟ
<b>ΓΕΝΙΚΑ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΙΣΤΙΚΑ</b>				
% του συνόλου	13.8	4.8	2.8	100.0
Μέσο μέγεθος	3.56	2.96	3.34	2.98
% συγκατοίκησης	3.5	14.7	11.8	1.9
% ενοικιαστών	48.5	91.8	94.1	26.1
% κτισμάτων προ του 1960	27.0	28.8	30.2	20.8
% έλλειψης βασικών εξυπηρετήσεων	11.1	11.2	12.7	3.9
<b>ΔΩΜΑΤΙΑ, ΧΩΡΟΣ &amp; ΑΡΙΘΜΟΣ ΜΕΛΩΝ</b>				
Δωμάτια/ άτομα	0.78	0.73	0.65	1.13
% δωμάτια<άτομα	55.1	59.7	72.1	24.8
% υπνοδωμάτια< άτομα -1	61.9	58.5	76.3	37.3
Μέση επιφάνεια ανά άτομο	18.6	17.5	15.1	27.5
% εμβαδού ανά άτομο< 25 τ.μ.	70.2	69.8	82.5	38.9
<b>ΔΩΜΑΤΙΑ, ΧΩΡΟΣ &amp; ΑΝΑΓΚΕΣ</b>				
Κατοικία μικρότερη από ανάγκες σε τ.μ.	68.0	79.9	86.6	36.6
Κατοικία μικρότερη από ανάγκες σε δωμάτια	59.7	70.4	75.2	26.6
Υπνοδωμάτια λιγότερα από αναγκαία	67.4	61.0	74.2	37.1

Πηγή: Έρευνα ΔΕΠΟΣ-MRC 1999

TABLE A6

## IMMIGRANT POPULATION IN ATHENS AND EAST ATTIKA, 2001

		ΝΟΜΑΡΧΙΑ ΑΘΗΝΩΝ			ΝΟΜΑΡΧΙΑ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΙΚΗΣ ΑΤΤΙΚΗΣ				
		M + F	M	F	%	M + F	M	F	%
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,664,776</b>	<b>1,266,498</b>	<b>1,398,278</b>		<b>403,918</b>	<b>205,038</b>	<b>198,880</b>	
Ελλάδα	Greek only	2,353,045	1,109,924	1,243,121		355,014	176,956	178,058	
<b>Ελληνική και :</b>	Greek dual nationality	31,984	13,553	18,431		5,163	2,320	2,843	
<b>Ξένη Υπηκοότητα</b>	<b>Foreign total</b>	<b>279,547</b>	<b>142,921</b>	<b>136,626</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>43,727</b>	<b>25,756</b>	<b>17,971</b>	<b>10.8</b>
Αλβανία	Albania	144,974	77,035	67,939	<b>51.9</b>	27,338	16,752	10,586	<b>62.5</b>
Κύπρος	Cyprus	9,580	4,683	4,897	<b>3.4</b>	914	504	410	<b>2.1</b>
Πολωνία	Poland	9,315	4,398	4,917	<b>3.3</b>	719	313	406	<b>1.6</b>
Βουλγαρία	Bulgaria	8,795	2,272	6,523	<b>3.1</b>	715	213	502	<b>1.6</b>
Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες	USA	7,708	3,509	4,199	<b>2.8</b>	1,040	497	543	<b>2.4</b>
Ρουμανία	Romania	7,038	3,854	3,184	<b>2.5</b>	844	503	341	<b>1.9</b>
Ουκρανία	Ukraine	6,742	1,492	5,250	<b>2.4</b>	636	152	484	<b>1.5</b>
Πακιστάν	Pakistan	5,895	5,615	280	<b>2.1</b>	1,490	1,454	36	<b>3.4</b>
Ιράκ	Iraq	5,720	3,860	1,860	<b>2.0</b>	127	91	36	<b>0.3</b>
Τουρκία	Turkey	5,699	2,695	3,004	<b>2.0</b>	581	346	235	<b>1.3</b>
Φιλιππίνες	Philippines	5,361	1,245	4,116	<b>1.9</b>	270	70	200	<b>0.6</b>
Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο	UK	4,813	2,145	2,668	<b>1.7</b>	1,076	439	637	<b>2.5</b>
Αίγυπτος	Egypt	4,783	3,432	1,351	<b>1.7</b>	423	330	93	<b>1.0</b>
Ρωσική Ομοσπ.	Russian Federation	4,332	1,363	2,969	<b>1.5</b>	1,083	426	657	<b>2.5</b>
Μπανγκλαντές	Bangladesh	4,069	3,938	131	<b>1.5</b>	110	105	5	<b>0.3</b>
Συρία	Syria	3,852	2,938	914	<b>1.4</b>	139	109	30	<b>0.3</b>
Γαλλία	France	2,982	1,221	1,761	<b>1.1</b>	472	235	237	<b>1.1</b>
Μολδαβία	Rep. of Moldova	2,910	782	2,128	<b>1.0</b>	230	56	174	<b>0.5</b>
Ιταλία	Italy	2,874	1,357	1,517	<b>1.0</b>	365	200	165	<b>0.8</b>
Γεωργία	Georgia	2,816	683	2,133	<b>1.0</b>	193	57	136	<b>0.4</b>
Γερμανία	Germany	2,666	1,090	1,576	<b>1.0</b>	725	301	424	<b>1.7</b>
Καναδάς	Canada	2,029	961	1,068	<b>0.7</b>	305	141	164	<b>0.7</b>
Αυστραλία	Australia	1,861	826	1,035	<b>0.7</b>	326	147	179	<b>0.7</b>
Νιγηρία	Nigeria	1,666	1,168	498	<b>0.6</b>	8	4	4	<b>0.0</b>
Αρμενία	Armenia	1,529	686	843	<b>0.5</b>	155	87	68	<b>0.4</b>
Αιθιοπία	Ethiopia	1,076	330	746	<b>0.4</b>	25	9	16	<b>0.1</b>
Ινδία	India	1,005	853	152	<b>0.4</b>	1,312	1,199	113	<b>3.0</b>
Γιουγκοσλαβία	Yugoslavia	974	444	530	<b>0.3</b>	113	53	60	<b>0.3</b>
Λίβανος	Lebanon	893	550	343	<b>0.3</b>	61	38	23	<b>0.1</b>
Ιαπωνία	Japan	756	311	445	<b>0.3</b>	12	4	8	<b>0.0</b>
Ιράν	Iran	744	530	214	<b>0.3</b>	43	27	16	<b>0.1</b>
Ισπανία	Spain	699	331	368	<b>0.3</b>	54	25	29	<b>0.1</b>
Σρι Λάνκα	Sri Lanka	653	246	407	<b>0.2</b>	42	18	24	<b>0.1</b>
Καζακστάν	Kazakhstan	643	245	398	<b>0.2</b>	202	93	109	<b>0.5</b>
Ολλανδία	Netherlands	611	265	346	<b>0.2</b>	134	48	86	<b>0.3</b>
Νότιος Αφρική	South Africa	593	288	305	<b>0.2</b>	74	26	48	<b>0.2</b>
Βέλγιο	Belgium	507	223	284	<b>0.2</b>	91	39	52	<b>0.2</b>
Κίνα	China	447	269	178	<b>0.2</b>	27	14	13	<b>0.1</b>
Αυστρία	Austria	444	188	256	<b>0.2</b>	132	69	63	<b>0.3</b>
Σουηδία	Sweden	434	165	269	<b>0.2</b>	107	50	57	<b>0.2</b>
Ιορδανία	Jordan	399	272	127	<b>0.1</b>	16	13	3	<b>0.0</b>
Ελβετία	Switzerland	394	170	224	<b>0.1</b>	80	27	53	<b>0.2</b>
Δανία	Denmark	391	166	225	<b>0.1</b>	70	34	36	<b>0.2</b>
Βραζιλία	Brazil	383	116	267	<b>0.1</b>	42	19	23	<b>0.1</b>
Μαρόκο	Morocco	368	204	164	<b>0.1</b>	22	14	8	<b>0.1</b>
Γκάνα	Ghana	310	214	96	<b>0.1</b>	6	4	2	<b>0.0</b>
Κορέα	Korea	286	138	148	<b>0.1</b>	24	10	14	<b>0.1</b>
Σουδάν	Sudan	268	187	81	<b>0.1</b>	8	5	3	<b>0.0</b>
Ισραήλ	Israel	256	155	101	<b>0.1</b>	16	8	8	<b>0.0</b>
	other nationality	6,204	2,913	3,291		744	384	360	

SOURCE: Census 2001

**Table A7: IMMIGRANTS IN GREECE, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL [self-declared] AND NATIONALITY, CENSUS 2001**

category	POST GRADUATE 1	FIRST DEGREE 2	POST SECONDARY QUALIFICATION 3	GENERAL SECONDARY 4	VOCATIONAL SECONDARY 5	COMPULSORY EDUCATION 6	PRIMARY EDUCATION 7	SOME PRIMARY SCHOOL 8	BASIC LITERATE 9	ILLITERATE 10	TOTAL
	<b>4,799</b>	<b>70,632</b>	<b>20,659</b>	<b>200,324</b>	<b>22,710</b>	<b>128,137</b>	<b>166,937</b>	<b>56,707</b>	<b>21,058</b>	<b>70,228</b>	<b>762,191</b>
Albanian	258	21,743	5,154	102,380	10,926	86,550	108,584	41,894	11,510	49,037	<b>438,036</b>
EU	1,665	10,571	3,605	13,909	1,165	4,234	5,894	2,421	701	2,665	<b>46,830</b>
Bulgarian	112	3,550	924	9,415	1,806	6,342	8,386	1,473	1,200	1,896	<b>35,104</b>
Georgian	37	3,859	717	5,700	839	3,313	4,405	1,754	741	1,510	<b>22,875</b>
Rumanian	73	1,452	526	10,087	1,016	3,410	3,309	545	407	1,169	<b>21,994</b>
USA	949	2,882	1,166	4,346	363	1,678	4,005	1,125	535	1,091	<b>18,140</b>
Russian Fedn.	88	3,375	815	4,414	899	2,341	2,823	1,194	464	1,122	<b>17,535</b>
Cypriot	500	4,091	772	9,017	267	779	1,337	268	129	266	<b>17,426</b>
Ukraine	51	3,527	950	4,087	802	1,486	1,520	615	140	438	<b>13,616</b>
Polish	58	1,249	633	4,946	1,273	1,671	1,228	654	98	1,021	<b>12,831</b>
Pakistani	19	196	252	2,194	169	2,403	3,406	72	886	1,533	<b>11,130</b>
Australian	76	982	478	2,080	313	1,118	2,444	463	412	401	<b>8,767</b>
Turkish	59	741	252	2,419	137	839	2,389	145	475	425	<b>7,881</b>
Armenian	17	1,316	246	2,131	332	1,037	1,265	744	181	473	<b>7,742</b>
Egyptian	46	1,379	349	2,069	255	762	1,129	203	322	934	<b>7,448</b>
Indian	23	115	87	1,459	196	1,524	2,586	45	411	770	<b>7,216</b>
Iraqi	22	375	155	1,158	161	1,015	1,933	511	502	1,104	<b>6,936</b>
Philippine	28	681	756	2,555	108	860	708	198	121	463	<b>6,478</b>
Canadian	158	880	406	1,539	226	660	1,384	404	143	249	<b>6,049</b>
Moldavian	10	1,260	454	1,800	304	657	694	277	70	190	<b>5,716</b>
Syrian	25	500	121	1,487	83	910	1,291	204	254	677	<b>5,552</b>
Bangladeshi	8	179	237	954	104	779	1,451	13	590	539	<b>4,854</b>
Yugoslav	39	928	187	1,312	153	409	349	195	45	215	<b>3,832</b>
Kazakhstani	6	320	82	578	156	344	411	170	55	134	<b>2,256</b>
Nigerian	20	387	97	716	30	187	226	118	37	197	<b>2,015</b>
Others	452	4,094	1,238	7,572	627	2,829	3,780	1,002	629	1,709	<b>23,932</b>

**Table A8: IMMIGRANTS' SELF-DECLARED EDUCATIONAL LEVELS IN GREECE, BY NATIONALITY [%]**

category	POST GRADUATE 1	FIRST DEGREE 2	SECONDARY QUALIFICATION 3	GENERAL SECONDARY 4	VOCATIONAL SECONDARY 5	COMPULSORY EDUCATION 6	PRIMARY EDUCATION 7	SOME PRIMARY SCHOOL 8	BASIC LITERATE 9	ILLITERATE 10	absolutes
	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	
Albania	0.1	5.0	1.2	23.4	2.5	19.8	24.8	9.6	2.6	11.2	438,036
EU	3.6	22.6	7.7	29.7	2.5	9.0	12.6	5.2	1.5	5.7	46,830
Bulgaria	0.3	10.1	2.6	26.8	5.1	18.1	23.9	4.2	3.4	5.4	35,104
Georgia	0.2	16.9	3.1	24.9	3.7	14.5	19.3	7.7	3.2	6.6	22,875
Rumania	0.3	6.6	2.4	45.9	4.6	15.5	15.0	2.5	1.9	5.3	21,994
USA	5.2	15.9	6.4	24.0	2.0	9.3	22.1	6.2	2.9	6.0	18,140
Russian Fedn.	0.5	19.2	4.6	25.2	5.1	13.4	16.1	6.8	2.6	6.4	17,535
Cyprus	2.9	23.5	4.4	51.7	1.5	4.5	7.7	1.5	0.7	1.5	17,426
Ukraine	0.4	25.9	7.0	30.0	5.9	10.9	11.2	4.5	1.0	3.2	13,616
Poland	0.5	9.7	4.9	38.5	9.9	13.0	9.6	5.1	0.8	8.0	12,831
Pakistan	0.2	1.8	2.3	19.7	1.5	21.6	30.6	0.6	8.0	13.8	11,130
Australia	0.9	11.2	5.5	23.7	3.6	12.8	27.9	5.3	4.7	4.6	8,767
Turkey	0.7	9.4	3.2	30.7	1.7	10.6	30.3	1.8	6.0	5.4	7,881
Armenia	0.2	17.0	3.2	27.5	4.3	13.4	16.3	9.6	2.3	6.1	7,742
Egypt	0.6	18.5	4.7	27.8	3.4	10.2	15.2	2.7	4.3	12.5	7,448
India	0.3	1.6	1.2	20.2	2.7	21.1	35.8	0.6	5.7	10.7	7,216
Iraq	0.3	5.4	2.2	16.7	2.3	14.6	27.9	7.4	7.2	15.9	6,936
Philippines	0.4	10.5	11.7	39.4	1.7	13.3	10.9	3.1	1.9	7.1	6,478
Canada	2.6	14.5	6.7	25.4	3.7	10.9	22.9	6.7	2.4	4.1	6,049
Moldavia	0.2	22.0	7.9	31.5	5.3	11.5	12.1	4.8	1.2	3.3	5,716
Syria	0.5	9.0	2.2	26.8	1.5	16.4	23.3	3.7	4.6	12.2	5,552
Bangladesh	0.2	3.7	4.9	19.7	2.1	16.0	29.9	0.3	12.2	11.1	4,854
Yugoslavia	1.0	24.2	4.9	34.2	4.0	10.7	9.1	5.1	1.2	5.6	3,832
Kazakhstan	0.3	14.2	3.6	25.6	6.9	15.2	18.2	7.5	2.4	5.9	2,256
Nigeria	1.0	19.2	4.8	35.5	1.5	9.3	11.2	5.9	1.8	9.8	2,015
Others	1.9	17.1	5.2	31.6	2.6	11.8	15.8	4.2	2.6	7.1	23,932
average for all nationalities	0.6	9.3	2.7	26.3	3.0	16.8	21.9	7.4	2.8	9.2	762,191

SOURCE: Census 2001

Note: some original categories of educational level have been combined, reducing them from 13 to 10.

Table A9

## IMMIGRANT CHILDREN IN GREEK STATE SCHOOLS

school popn	total immigrant	immig %	returnees	level	year
	30,193		19,559	primary	1995/6
	13,900		9,943	secondary	
	7,412		1,530	kinder	1999/00
601,186	58,571	9.7	17,918	primary	
732,000	27,667	3.8	11,192	secondary	
138,304	11,083	8.0	1,580	kinder	2002/3
633,235	67,149	10.6	12,579	primary	
328,309	33,385	10.2	10,692	gymnasio	
360,616	18,497	5.1	7,022	lyceum +	
688,925	51,882	7.5	17,714	tot second.	
138,304	11,083				
633,235	67,149				
1,460,464	130,114	8.9			

**Table A10**


**GREEK NATURALIZATION DATA, 1980-2003\***

Year	foreign Greeks	foreigners without Greek ethnicity
1980	172	168
1981	959	186
1982	4,996	336
1983	2,776	470
1984	1,444	367
1985	1,483	126
1986	807	397
1987	1,937	279
1988	1,313	258
1989	845	372
1990	691	399
1991	688	198
1992	857	347
1993	1,273	531
1994	99	225
1995	2,744	973
1996	995	409
1997	1,250	1,064
1998	655	1,824
1999	599	1,366
2000	464	543
2001	690	1,084
2002	445	1,696
2003	528	1,368
1980-2003	28,710	14,986

\* excludes granting of Greek citizenship to ethnic Greeks from Pontos [data unavailable]

SOURCE: official communication from the Ministry of the Interior, to the Mediterranean Migration Observatory, Panteion University, Athens. April 2004.

CHART A1: Immigrant labourforce in Greece, 2001, principal nationalities, by gender and duration of stay




Note: self-declared data

SOURCE: Census, 2001




Chart A2: EXPULSIONS [without legal process] from Greece, 1991-2001




SOURCE: Greek Ministry of Public Order

**CHART A3: Male immigrant occupations, Greece, 2001 - absolutes**




SOURCE: Census, 2001

**CHART A4: Male immigrant occupations, Greece, percentages by nationality**




SOURCE: Census, 2001

**CHART A5: Female immigrant occupations, Greece - absolutes**




SOURCE: Census, 2001

CHART A6: Female immigrant occupations in Greece, percentages




SOURCE: Census 2001

**CHART A7: Nominal membership of IKA, 2002, by nationality**




SOURCE: IKA Statistics

**CHART A8: Non-construction insurance with IKA, 2002, principal nationalities, by gender**



SOURCE: IKA statistics

CHART A9: Nominal insurance with IKA, 2002 [construction only]




Mediterranean  
Migration  
Observatory

female  
male

SOURCE: IKA statistics




**CHART A10: Social Insurance contributions (IKA) 2002**  
**[all sectors other than construction]**



**Mediterranean**  
**Migration**  
**Observatory**

**Greeks**  
**Non-Greeks**


**CHART A11: Social Insurance contributions (IKA) 2002  
[construction only]**



**Mediterranean  
Migration  
Observatory**


**Greeks**  
**Non-Greeks**

**CHART A12: Immigrants in Greece: relative shares in educational level, by nationality**



SOURCE: elaboration of data from 2001 Census

**Map 1.** Immigrant enterprises in the study area according to the country of origin of the entrepreneur



Source: Kolios 2003

**Map 2.** Immigrant enterprises in the study area according to the sector within which they operate



Source: Kolios 2003